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Abstract
This thesis shows how a combination of macro-economic, business, and organizational
factors can lead a well-run company to adopt a "launch-and-expedite" behavior with
detrimental effects on operational efficiency. It also demonstrates how it is possible, for
an organization that finds itself in such a state, to apply basic operations principles and a
data driven approach to systematically get out of the "launch-and-expedite" mode.
The thesis presents a method to characterize a real, functioning supply chain in the
context of changing conditions and in the absence of perfect data. It shows the analysis,
recommendations, and results from a particular supply chain case study at Agilent
Technologies, Inc. The project first analyzes and maps the current supply chain to
characterize demand and supply variability. A selected menu of operational building
blocks is then recommended to improve overall supply chain performance by reducing
the internal bullwhip effect and improving on-time delivery. The recommendations are
implemented in a successful pilot study and key operational metrics are recorded such as
supply chain inventory, on-time delivery, variability of lead-time, and number of
expedite/schedule change requests. The particular organizational context of the project
and its affect is also considered.
Although this thesis provides a case study of the Colorado Springs Technical Center
operations and supply chain, results and lessons learned are applicable to other
component suppliers or component buyers within multi-node supply chains, particularly
those in the capital equipment business.
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Chapter 1: Introduction
1.1 Project motivation
The cyclic nature of the high-tech industry is well known in business. In particular, the
capital equipment manufacturers that supply the high-tech industry are subject to an even
greater volatility than that driven by the end consumer. These equipment manufacturers,
as a result of their upstream position in the supply chain are subject to an amplification of
demand variability often referred to as the bullwhip effect (see Figure 1.1). The bullwhip
effect has been widely studied in supply chains and discussed in the literature (Felch
1997; Coughlin 1998; Blake 1999; Anderson 2000; Spearman 2000; Sterman 2000;
Blaha 2002; Simchi-Levi 2003).
Raw Equipment Semiconductor Computer Customer
material manufacturer manufacturer manufacturer c
upstream 4 downstream
Figure 1.1: Supply chain for high-tech capital equipment manufacturer
However, it is important to make a distinction between the variability amplification
experienced by the manufacturers of finished goods and that faced by capital equipment
manufacturers. For equipment manufacturers, the increased demand volatility is
experienced as demand driven changes in the desired manufacturing capacity (Anderson
2000). For example, a small percentage change in the demand for computers will
produce a much larger percentage change in the demand for equipment to make the
microprocessors that are inside the computers. In macroeconomics this effect is known
as the investment accelerator (Samuelson 1939).
To fully comprehend the extent of the volatility faced by equipment manufacturers in the
semiconductor and electronics business, consider Figure 1.2 (Fine 2005).
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Figure 1.2: Variability in the semiconductor and electronics supply chain
This figure plots data from the US economy over the period of 1961 - 2001. Five time
series are plotted: (1) year-to-year percent changes for semiconductor equipment sales;
(2) semiconductor shipments; (3) electronics, computing, and communications equipment
output; (4) gross domestic product (GDP) USA; and (5) GDP World. Note the extent to
which the equipment sales overshoot both the bull and the bear markets throughout
several decades of data. It is also important to note that in this industry, the pattern
repeats every 4-7 years. Experienced leaders of such firms are familiar with the pattern,
as expressed in the following quote (Barnholt 2003):
"This is my seventh business cycle in my 37 years with HP and Agilent, and one
thing I know is business cycles do end But markets are always different when
cycles end than when they started The challenge is to understand the structural
changes that are going on in our industry to be ready for the new opportunities as
they come along."
- Ned Barnholt, Agilent Technologies Chairman and CEO
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The macroeconomic trends and bullwhip effect on high-tech capital equipment
manufacturers highlighted in Figure 1.1 provide the external context and motivation for
this thesis. However, this thesis focuses on the internal concerns relevant for the
management of such firms including:
(1) What should the operations strategy be for a capital equipment manufacturer
in a high-tech and highly cyclical industry?
(2) How can a typical company that desires to recover from a downturn
restructure its operations to perform well not only in the next upturn but also to
survive the next downturn?
(3) What data should be collected to characterize the current situation?
(4) What specific actions can be taken to begin a change towards a new, more
robust operational structure?
This thesis will examine these fundamental operations questions in the context of the
semiconductor and electronics equipment business based upon applied research
conducted on-site at Agilent Technologies in the Colorado Springs Technical Center, but
the results and findings can be generalized as applicable to other high-tech equipment
manufacturers, who aim to strengthen their operational competitiveness.
1.2 Agilent
Agilent Technologies became an independent company from Hewlett-Packard in 1999,
focusing on the test & measurement, automated test, semiconductor, and life sciences
parts of the business. In the short time since independence the company has weathered
many changes from a spectacular market upturn to an abysmal downturn and a
subsequent on-going recovery.
Additionally, with growing competition and maturation of its product architecture,
Agilent has been shifting from historically vertically integrated businesses to increasing
use of external suppliers, contract manufacturers, and low-cost labor regions for final
assembly of products. During this transition, much attention has been focused on Agilent
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final assembly and test site operations while less attention has been given to
manufacturing organizations within the firm. This thesis considers the role of key
internal component manufacturers and their new supply chain relationships within the
firm.
1.3 Global Supply Chain Engineering (GSCE)
The Global Supply Chain Engineering (GSCE) group at Agilent sponsored this research
in order to better understand the role of key internal component suppliers in the new
Agilent supply chain.
The initial goal of this work was to model and analyze an Agilent supply chain that
included an internal Agilent component supplier, as well as an Agilent final assembly
site. This model would then be used to simulate and quantify the effects of different
operational policies, such as safety stock levels or scheduling rules, on operational
efficiency. The ultimate project goal was to improve operations within an Agilent supply
chain by understanding the unique characteristics of internal component suppliers within
the chain and designing an operations strategy to best capitalize on this understanding.
1.4 Chapter overview
This thesis is organized into seven chapters. Chapter 2 introduces the Colorado Springs
Technical Center (CSTC) in terms of its structure, objectives and strategy within the
larger context of Agilent's Electronic Products and Services (EPSG) division. Chapter 3
characterizes the current CSTC operations within the Agilent supply chain and a
computerized ERP system. Chapter 4 recommends the application of specific operations
principles based on a data-driven analysis in order to drive improvements in CSTC
performance. Chapter 5 presents the challenges, learning, and data from a pilot
implementation of the recommendations at the CSTC. Chapter 6 addresses the specific
organizational context and its influence on further operational improvements at CSTC.
Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the conclusions of this research and the lessons learned.
In addition, opportunities for further work as well as the applicability of the conclusions
to other companies or industries are discussed.
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Chapter 2: Colorado Springs Technical Center (CSTC)
2.1 Organizational structure and background information
HP purchased the site of the current CSTC operations in 1962 and micro-circuit work
began on the site in 1969. The CSTC was formally created in 1975 to manufacture key
components in support of Hewlett-Packard's growing test and measurement business.
Historically, the CSTC was part of the Colorado Springs Group, which functioned as a
stand-alone profit center within the larger company. Ownership of CSTC was officially
transferred to Agilent when the company spun out of HP in 1999. Currently, the CSTC
functions as a cost center within the Multi-Industry Business Unit (MIBU) of Agilent.
The CSTC manufactures low-level components which are used in Agilent products
across all four divisions: (1) Test and Measurement; (2) Semiconductor Products; (3)
Automated Test; and (4) Life Sciences and Chemical Analysis. Per a company policy
aimed to preserve Agilent's competitive advantage, CSTC does not sell its components
on the open market. The majority of CSTC components (93%) are used in products for
the Electronic Products and Services Group (EPSG) part of the Test and Measurement
Division. Within EPSG, the two major internal customers for CSTC are the Multi-
Industry Business Unit (MIBU) and the Computing and Networking Solutions Business
Unit (CNSBU). The shaded organizations in Figure 2.1 will be the focus of the work
described in this thesis.
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Figure 2.1: Distribution of CSTC products to product organizations at Agilent
Discussion of CSTC components in this case study will be limited to those made for
MIBU products, which are a $2.1 B market for Agilent annually. This represents the
largest CSTC customer when the products are dollar-weighted. Although it won't be
addressed specifically in this thesis, the diversity of customers and markets served by the
CSTC does complicate its strategy and objectives. Oscilloscopes and logic analyzers are
examples of MIBU products which are sold to other electronics firms for test and
measurement applications, representing a $650M annual market size for Agilent. Typical
examples of these products are shown in Figure 2.2.
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Figure 2.2: Logic Analyzers (left) and Oscilloscope (right)
Some examples of components manufactured by CSTC include: hybrid integrated circuits
and probe tips with integrated logic. However, the CSTC is most often recognized in
terms of its process capabilities, not the specific products it manufacturers. These
process capabilities include:
" Thick film, thin film (wet), and laser
" Chip and wire bond
" Final assembly (solder, encapsulation, lid bond, etc.)
" Test (included several custom Agilent automated test equipment systems)
The CSTC is at the forefront of developing new process technologies and using these
technologies in production. As such, the manufacturing processes performed at the
CSTC are complex and often rely on the skill and tacit knowledge of technicians,
operators and engineers at the site.
CSTC is currently run as a cost center and led by the plant manager. The types of
personnel included in the CSTC organization are process engineers, quality engineers,
equipment operators, planners, buyers and various supervisors and project leads. In 2004
there were approximately 90 associates working in the CSTC. Due to the market
slowdown, only one shift was run on most equipment and two shifts were only used if
necessary to meet scheduled output requirements.
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2.2 Organizational goals
"New products are the life-blood of our company... It's important to recognize that when
we talk about innovation, we're not just talking about product innovation. We're talking
about innovation in process ftoo]... " - Ned Barnholt, Agilent Chairman and CEO
The overarching goal of CSTC and Agilent is to increase market demand for Agilent
products through innovation - including creating demand through obsolescing and
cannibalizing demand for its own products. As a process center, the CSTC supports
Agilent's corporate strategy and culture of innovation by leading the industry in process
innovations. These process innovations enable the products designed by Agilent
development engineers to reach the marketplace ahead of the competition. While cost
pressure has increased in importance of late, developing process capabilities for low-
volume, high-mix production remains the primary goal for CSTC in order to satisfy the
unique needs of its internal customers.
Additionally, the unstated goal of any firm is self-preservation, and the goal of CSTC is
no different. Following the market downturn that began in 2001, the CSTC was
challenged to re-position itself competitively in relationship to potential external
suppliers. Despite increased outsourcing of higher volume products, the CSTC continues
to occupy a key strategic position in the Agilent supply chain by providing manufacturing
for prototyping, process development, new product launches, spares, and other low-
volume products.
2.3 Market based view
Agilent and CSTC have typically led the market in the introduction of new products and
product features. For example, the Colorado Springs Group originally created the entire
market segment for Logic Analyzers. Before introduction by Agilent, this product
category did not even exist. Agilent products represent the highest quality products
available in terms of features, options/customization, service and support. These high
quality products are sold at a significant price premium in the marketplace. The high-end
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customer needs for the electronics test and measurement market can be distinguished
from other customer segments. In the high end, there is little elasticity of demand.
Customers require the highest performance products and are willing to pay what is
necessary to acquire these products. Customers, in exchange for this price premium, also
expect responsiveness on the part of the manufacturer as well as excellent service and
support. Moving only slightly down-market in product performance can have a
significant influence on the basis of competition. In the mid to lower-end segments, price
is a significant consideration and many suppliers compete for this business. Typically,
Agilent does not develop new products for the lower-end market segments, but instead
sells its more mature products to meet the needs of these segments.
Although Agilent (HP) initially created many of the markets it serves, over time
competition has developed and increased. As more of the electronic components
necessary to build the equipment Agilent produces become commodities, competitors
have been able to move up-market in quality while still offering low-priced products.
This has led to increasing competition and pricing pressure in Agilent's traditional
markets (see Figure 2.2).
Quality ----------------
high Agilent Technologies
low
Competition
high II low Price
Figure 2.3: Competitive positioning of typical Agilent and CSTC products
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Agilent's CEO Ned Barnholt highlighted this shift in the nature of competition during his
speech at SEMICON West in 2003:
"We're in a period of lots ofprice pressures, continuing excess capacity, and
pressure for time-to-market, bringing new technologies and products to market.
These aren't going away, and the focus on operations improvement and cost
reductions is much greater now than when we went into this downturn three years
ago. ... We're in a market-share battle - allfighting for a limited piece of the pie
as opposed to the capacity-expansion battle where we were all trying to keep up
with the growth rate of the industry. That means there has to be a lot of
improvement in operations, whether in the way we run fabs or in the way we run
our equipment businesses for minimum costs and competitiveness. There'sjust a
lot more cost pressure across the industry, all the way from the component to the
equipment providers."
2.4 Resource based view
The resources of Agilent, including the CSTC, are designed to support the primary goal
of the firm as noted in section 2.2 above. As a result, the CSTC production objective is
to lead the world in prototype, new product introduction and low-volume high-mix
manufacturing. In addition, since engineering innovation is central to Agilent's
competitive advantage, product and process innovation are tightly coupled. For the
CSTC this link between product and process innovation is a key resource in development
and delivery of oscilloscopes and logic analyzers because the engineers are co-located.
Overall, however, the goal of the company is to remove manufacturing from the critical
path of delivering innovative products to high-end customers. Recently with the market
softness, there has also been an emphasis on limiting manufacturing costs; however, this
is not historically a primary business concern for Agilent. In general, Agilent cultivates
world-class engineering innovation, while manufacturing operations are a lower priority.
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Because of the significant first-mover advantage for an innovation-based strategy, the
capacity strategy for the organization has been to lead demand. That is, the CSTC aims
to have more manufacturing capacity than the market requires, so capacity does not
become a "bottleneck" for the company (Goldratt 1984). With such a strategic design,
marketing and sales are usually the bottleneck, not the factory. During the boom of 1999,
however, total industry capacity, as well as capacity at Agilent, lagged market demand
and this re-positioned manufacturing as a bottleneck. Thus the boom of 1999 shows that
it is possible in a highly cyclic industry despite a capacity strategy to lead demand, to end
up lagging demand at the peaks of business cycles.
Policies of Agilent corporate and the macro-economic environment influence CSTC
resources in several ways and thus must be considered in any future operations strategy
development. The company is continuing to lower its cost structure by converting
previously fixed costs to variable costs. Following this emphasis, managers are
encouraged to outsource as much as possible. While management at CSTC supported
this corporate initiative, they found that some products could not be made outside and
after several tries were forced to bring the products back in-house for manufacturing.
Although previously the CSTC had been part of the Colorado Springs Group profit
center, the CSTC is currently organized as a cost-center. Measures of success for CSTC
management include: on-time delivery, warranty rates, injury/illness rates, variance in
controllable spending, variance in cost of sales, variance in price of purchased goods, and
variance in inventory dollars. Because of the cost-center mentality, one can see that most
of the management metrics are focused on variances with the plan or budget for the
quarter. The only management metrics that are absolute are on-time delivery, warranty,
and injury/illness rates. This is an important consideration for a new operations strategy
that will be revisited in the implementation section (Chapter 5).
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2.5 Chapter summary
This chapter presented the current strategy of Agilent and the Colorado Springs Technical
Center in terms of the value proposition, the capabilities, the processing network and
resources of the firm. As indicated by the CEO, Ned Barnholt, in his speeches, the nature
of competition for Agilent and CSTC is changing, so the company must respond by re-
considering its strategy.
This chapter highlights the importance of articulating an operations strategy even in a
high-margin, low volume business like electronics test and measurement. An operations
strategy provides cohesion between the high-level business strategy of the CEO and the
daily decisions that must be made by line managers. In addition, it helps unify decision-
making amidst pricing pressure, as a sector matures or under cost rationalization pressure
during a market downturn.
Often a clear operations strategy that integrates with the financial and overall strategy of
the firm has not been articulated. This was the case at CSTC at the beginning of the
applied research project. The management's operations strategy was primarily reactive
as is often the case in a rapid market downturn. One of the goals of this work was to
encourage CSTC management to articulate a proactive operations strategy based on the
market realities and resources of the division in order to clearly define the means to
achieve the firms' performance objectives.
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Chapter 3: Direct observation of the current reality
This chapter introduces the CSTC role in the supply chain and provides both a qualitative
and quantitative description of the current state of operations in this supply chain from
the perspective of the component supplier. Although industry cycles in the electronics
test and measurement business are outside of the control of Agilent management, internal
sources of variability can be minimized. This chapter presents sources of internal
variability in the CSTC supply chain by examining internal data from forecasting,
planning, and customer order flow. In addition, it considers other operational practices
regarding capacity, job scheduling, inventory management, and metrics which also
contribute to the internal bullwhip effect as it applies to the CSTC - at the tail end of the
internal Agilent supply chain.
Whereas Figure 1.1 from the introduction illustrates Agilent's position in an external
supply chain relative to electronics consumers, Figure 3.1 illustrates the position of CSTC
within the internal Agilent supply chain, relative to direct customers of Agilent -
typically other electronics and semiconductor businesses.
raw
material
CSTC final assembly Agilent
components & test customer
conrc (Malaysia)
contract
components manufacturer
(board load)
upstream downstream
Figure 3.1: CSTC supply chain material flow
The CSTC and the final assembly and test site in Malaysia (officially known as PIMO -
Penang Integrated Manufacturing Operations) are facilities owned by Agilent, but lower-
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level components can be sourced from either internal or external suppliers depending on
the part. In today's supply chain design printed circuit boards (PCBs) are almost always
loaded for Agilent by a third party contract manufacturer (CM). The data presented in
this section will focus on the shaded supply chain nodes which are wholly owned and
controlled by Agilent. In the future, the same type of analysis and supply chain mapping
could be extended to include the other nodes of the Agilent supply chain.
3.1 Forecasting and planning
"In our business, we look at technology waves. In the communications industry, storage
industry and computer industry, new standards come along at a fairly rapid pace. Ifyou
don't catch that wave, you've missed the market. These waves generally are not very
long, so you have to be there right at the front edge to be able to capitalize on
them. "(Barnholt 2003)
Demand planning and forecasting of product sales is a sophisticated and complex process
at Agilent Technologies. The company strategy of innovation dictates that Agilent is
constantly pushing the "clockspeed" of the industry faster (Fine 1998). This makes it
very important to effectively manage the ramp-up and ramp-down of products as typical
life-cycles for high-end oscilloscope products have shrunk from 15 years to less than 3
years, with under one year of sales at peak margins before a higher performance product
will begin to cannibalize the market.
Product family forecasts are developed and updated monthly by demand planners who
work for a marketing group in a specific division. Detailed internal statistics are kept by
the marketing organization on the historical accuracy of the forecasts, forecast bias,
confidence intervals, etc. A product within a family may originally be forecast as a
percentage of the total family demand. As the product family begins to sell and more
information is available about customer preferences, this planning percentage is often
adjusted to reflect actual customer demand. Although significant adjustments are
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common for individual products, or product options, forecasts for aggregate product
families are quite accurate.
Figure 3.2 shows graphically the way in which forecast information is propagated
throughout the organization to lower level component suppliers, such as the CSTC,
through the ERP system.
S- - - PIMO - - --- contract
CSTC BuyMeO Org manufacturer
Buy/Sll Og. W(PCB load)
L A
PIMO ~~~~ ERP system
manufacturing advanced plan
IL I
weekly planned
demand
monthly forecast
Figure 3.2: Flow of information and parts through the supply chain
A typical monthly forecast predicts 18 months into the future and is first entered into the
computerized ERP system and then translated from calendar months to ERP system
weeks. If necessary, forecasts can be updated by the demand planner, but only for time
periods two months out in the future or greater. Although the conversion of the forecast
from calendar months to ERP system weeks introduces some additional variability into
the system, it can be shown mathematically that the additional variability is not
significant (see Appendix A). However, this additional variability can cause some
confusion to planners who review the weekly planned orders and see the production rates
changing, when in fact they are not changing.
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Once the forecast is in the computer system as "planned demand", the forecast is
"exploded" down to lower level components of the forecasted product based on the
product bill of materials, options, and planning percentages. For components that the
CSTC sells directly to PIMO via the buy/sell organization, the planned demand seen in
the ERP system by CSTC contains both demand that might be manually entered by
PIMO (special orders, big sales, yield loss issues at PIMO) and demand that is derived
from the original product forecast. Because the plan is "run" weekly, the propagation of
changes to lower level components happens weekly between internal organizations. The
weekly planned demand is changed often as production schedules for final assembly and
actual customer demand patterns change.
One surprising observation is that it was not possible for a planner at the CSTC to use the
centralized ERP system to view the original upper-level forecast data entered by the
division demand planner for his or her assigned products. Permission settings in the ERP
system restricted planners in one Agilent organization from accessing information in
another Agilent organization, because the ERP system treated each organization code as a
separate entity. This was a change from previous IT systems used by CSTC which had
developed organically at the division level and allowed information sharing within a
division, but not necessarily across divisions.
Planners in the CSTC employed several coping strategies to improve information
transparency. First they had almost daily phone calls with the buyers in Malaysia to
confirm orders and to understand the relative importance of orders in the ERP system.
Additionally, when demand seemed very strange, planners at CSTC would sometimes
speak directly with the product level demand planner. Although this practice was
acceptable in the past within the Colorado Springs Group, management in Malaysia very
much discouraged this information sharing.
Another less surprising observation is that despite the sophistication of the original
forecast information produced, the only information that gets propagated through the
23
ERP system to lower level suppliers is a point forecast - not the forecast with bands of
confidence or certainty. For example, a forecast that was highly accurate and one that
was known to be much less accurate by the demand planning organization would both be
translated by the ERP system to a supplier as a single point forecast. Therefore, much of
the important information contained in a forecast could be lost as it was "exploded"
through the bill of materials. (Note: Agilent is actively pursuing methods to include this
information such as structured contracting. However, this relatively new approach is not
pervasive within the company and not used currently with internal suppliers (Schmidt
2003).)
In the case of an external supplier, such as a PCB loader, the supplier can access a
website that provides the weekly planned demand for the supplier's parts. This
information is updated weekly. The PCB loader takes this weekly planned demand
information and generates its own forecast. If the PCB uses parts which are supplied by
an Agilent internal organization such as CSTC, the new forecast of the PCB loader is
then entered manually on a website for the Agilent buy/sell team. The buy/sell team then
translates the information back into the ERP system for the CSTC.
This additional translation requirement adds a minimum two-week delay to the demand
planning process for externally processed parts when compared with the internal process.
For example, for an externally loaded PCB in week one, the demand is shared with the
contract manufacturer (CM). In the second week, assuming no data accuracy issues, the
new demand is shared from the CM to the Agilent Buy/Sell team. In the third week the
information is updated in the plan seen by the CSTC. In addition, Agilent employees
often referred to the forecast being "broken" when it was sent to outside contract
manufacturers. This is because once a part had gone outside the ERP system and
required manual entry of lower level demand information, it was not possible to trace the
demand signal back to the original forecast for a part (although theoretically it should be).
Within the division that makes oscilloscopes and logic analyzers, the demand planner
who generates the monthly forecasts is measured on three qualities: bias, forecast error
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and stability. This information is also used to improve the monthly product forecasts in
the future. An interesting observation is that beyond the monthly forecast, there is no
formal measure of weekly demand plan accuracy. In addition, the weekly demand plan,
which is updated weekly, is not archived, so it is not possible to determine its bias, error,
or stability in comparison with actual orders. Currently there are no metrics focused on
the weekly demand plan, so information about it is not monitored.
Several meaningful conclusions can be made from this high-level treatment of Agilent's
demand planning and forecasting process.
1. The traditional role of demand planning in Agilent is to serve the sales and
marketing organization, not production and operations.
2. Lower-level internal component suppliers, such as CSTC, do not have access to
end customer demand data, despite an integrated ERP system.
3. Lower-level internal component suppliers, such as CSTC, receive different
demand information than final assembly and test sites because of delays in
propagation of the forecast (~ 2 weeks) and various built-in order modifiers in
the ERP system.
4. The conversion of monthly forecasts to ERP weeks does not significantly affect
forecast variability (see Appendix A).
3.2 Customer order flow
Given the uncertainly in much of the supply chain data as well as the lack of archived
information on forecasts and demand in particular, one method which proved valuable in
characterizing the supply chain was to map the flow of customer orders. The following
example illustrates this useful methodology.
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3.2.1 Determine true customer demand at final assembly factory
First, a component manufactured by CSTC is chosen. Using bill-of-materials data all the
upper level assemblies which use the component are identified as well as the quantities of
each component per upper level assembly.
Next, historical order data is collected for each of the final customer-purchasable
products identified. There are many dates associated with a customer order in the ERP
system, such as order-ordered date, order booked date, customer request date, order ship
date, etc. This example uses the customer request date, which represents the date the
customer would like to have the product, minus the average shipment time in days from
the final assembly plant to the customer location. The product order history data is then
aggregated based on the BOM structure quantities previously identified. This
transformed and aggregated data represents what we will call the true demand for a given
CSTC component at the final assembly site.
While the customer order data was recorded daily, internal orders between organizations
were only placed weekly so it is logical to aggregate customer order data into weekly
buckets. Monthly buckets were also considered. However, with high-end products
having a maximum life cycle of three years, a product in production was likely to have
less than 15 monthly data points available so weekly data aggregation was selected as the
preferred method. Figure 3.3 shows aggregated customer demand for Component A.
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Figure 3.3: Component A weekly customer demand data'
For example, if this demand was approximately normally distributed with a mean,
D ~ 40 and a standard deviation, GD 20, customer orders as seen from the perspective
of final assembly would have a coefficient of variation (COV) as follows:
COV ,,,,,,= = 0.5
Cofinalassemhly -' .
PD
3.2.2 Determine order history between final assembly and component
manufacture
Shipment requests (i.e. orders) are placed weekly between the buyer at the final assembly
site (PIMO) and the planner at the component manufacturing site (CSTC) via the
computerized ERP system. This is a semi-automated process in which the computer will
recommend the order, but the buyer and planner must both electronically approve the
1 Throughout this thesis y-axis numerical values are blank in order to protect the confidentiality of the
sponsoring organization. In some cases specific numerical results are provided for the purposes of example
and should not be construed to be actual results of the sponsoring organization.
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order before it will ship. The size of the order is determined by the demand forecast for
the next week at the final assembly site, any yield loss in final assembly, and any order
modifiers which restrict the minimum, maximum or multiple size of the order. For
example, if electronic chips supplied by the component manufacturer are delivered on a
reel with 100 units per reel, this would be the multiple required by the order modifier.
Figure 3.4 shows an example of the order history for a product between the final
assembly site and CSTC.
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Figure 3.4: Component A weekly order history between final assembly and CSTC
Note that because of order modifiers in the system for this component, the final assembly
site is ordering in groups of units. For example, if we let each order be for 50 units and
consider an order an event, this data can be approximated by a Poisson distribution with
mean k= 0.52 and variance X = 0.52. The coefficient of variation (COV) for the order
history in Figure 3.4 can then be calculated (See Appendix B for additional calculation
details).
COVomponent - D - =1.4
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3.2.3 The internal bullwhip effect
With a mathematical representation of the true customer demand and the internal order
history between final assembly and the component manufacturer the variability can be
compared between the two nodes of the supply chain using the coefficient of variation.
=COVopnet 1.4
Variability Amplification - '"'"o""n"' - 1 = 2.8
CoVfinalassembly 0.5
This means that given a certain variability of customer demand, the structure and system
of propagating orders from final assembly to component manufacturing is amplifying that
variability by 2.8 times. This phenomenon of increasing variability as we move upstream
in the supply chain is known as the bullwhip effect and the comparison of COVs between
nodes of a supply chain is one way to quantify the bullwhip effect (Simchi-Levi 2003).
3.3 Capacity management
Manufacturing capacity at a firm can be considered in terms of human resources,
machine resources, and contracted/purchased resources. Each type of capacity possesses
unique aspects to be considered in operations planning and strategy.
For physical resources, the CSTC facility had excess machine capacity. It was originally
designed for three shifts of almost 24 hours a day operation, but was currently only
running one or at most two eight-hour shifts per day. The equipment supported both low
and medium volume production processes for Agilent. Prior to the downturn in 2001, the
CSTC produced some high volume thick-film products, so it also had some automated
equipment alongside the semi-automated and manual process equipment typically used
for lower volume products and prototype production.
Although in 2004 there were sufficient machine resources in aggregate, it was possible at
times that due to the high mix of product a particular machine in test could be over-
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utilized. Manufacturing at CSTC is divided into three areas: (1) thick film; (2) wire
bond, die-attach and laser; and (3) assembly and test. While the equipment in the thick-
film, wire bond, die attach, and laser areas was primarily flexible and could be used to
manufacture a variety of products, the equipment in test was specialized. For example,
Component A could only be tested on Test Equipment A. Therefore, if demand was high
in a particular week for multiple components that all required final test on Test
Equipment A, this could lead to Final Test being a constraint on throughput for CSTC.
The second determinant of CSTC capacity is human resources. The typical response by
management, if test was becoming a bottleneck due to uneven distribution of work
between test equipment, was to shift some test operators to second shift. In addition,
most operators were cross-trained in order to increase human resource flexibility, thus
improving the responsiveness of CSTC to mix variability.
Reducing variability or "smoothing" demand on human capacity was a significant
concern of management in the CSTC. During the downturn, the total number of
operators had been reduced from a peak of 110 to 14. This weighed heavily on
management's mind as demand for CSTC products picked up. Management preferred to
contract temporary workers to support peak demand periods rather than to hire Agilent
employees. This was also due to the corporate emphasis on reducing fixed costs. Total
operator hours were closely tracked by manufacturing planning. During this six-month
project, operators were typically over 100% utilization according to the plan; however,
management was still cautious about bringing on more operators. Only when the plan
going forward showed a period of greater than 100% operator utilization for longer than
two quarters did management work to bring on additional operators.
The theoretical implication of this approach to human capacity is that as utilization
approaches 100%, queueing times for work orders in the CSTC shop will approach
infinity. However, since this is not an acceptable outcome, other actions will be taken by
management before the actual queueing time reaches infinity. These measures will likely
include overtime, productivity enhancement efforts, and expediting of late jobs.
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Another proxy for human resource capacity at CSTC is process engineers or technicians.
Although this type of information was not tracked by the ERP system, skilled technicians
or process engineers were regularly needed to assist with set-ups for manufacturing.
These setup times represented about four to five times the per unit processing time for
components made at CSTC. Sometimes operators would have to switch to work on
another work order, while they waited for a skilled technician or engineering to assist
with a setup.
The CSTC was increasing its use of outside vendors as part of the Agilent strategy to
reduce fixed costs. In general, this strategy was effective in reducing fixed costs for the
company; however, as CSTC was a low volume customer for these vendors, the CSTC
could not exert much buyer power over the vendors. Often this led to delays in material
availability for key CSTC components, which delayed the start of work orders according
to the plan. As a result, CSTC management was considering the possibility of reserving
some capacity at key vendors in the future.
3.4 Job scheduling and WIP management
"WIP is what it is. WIP is not something we can control. We have to report on it, but I
really don'tfocus on it because it is not determined by us." - Planning manager at CSTC
Work orders at the CSTC are scheduled for release into the shop by the centralized ERP
plan. They are released based on the lead time for the component, as long as the planner
for the item has verified that the material is available to complete the job. Capacity of the
shop is not considered when releasing jobs according to the plan.
An important relationship between WIP, throughput and cycle time is expressed by
Little's Law (Spearman 2000):
(Inventory in WIP) = (throughput) *(flow time)
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I=R*T
Consider the status of WIP at the CSTC. At current production levels there were on
average 300 work orders in WIP in the CSTC shop at any given time. These 300 work
orders were made of 124 different part numbers on average. Each work order would take
an average 80 hours of processing time to complete (not including queueing time).
Therefore we have I = 24,000 hours of work. On average there were 12 operators
working on first shift and 4 on second. The rate of work completion is then R = 128
hours per day. From Little's Law we get an average 187 days completion time!
While the above estimate is extremely rough, it can certainly be concluded that there
were significantly more jobs in the shop than could be expected to be worked on in a
given day or week. This rough estimate was confirmed by conversations with operators
who estimated on average each operator would work on 1-2 jobs per shift, i.e. about 32
jobs would be worked on in a given day or about 10% of the 300 jobs in the shop.
With so many jobs to choose from, scheduling and prioritization of jobs was very
important and challenging. Every morning, CSTC lead operators, planners, and
managers would meet to determine priorities for the day based on shipment requests in
the ERP system and phone conversations with customers. Because of the limited human
capacity of the shop, this method ofjob scheduling resulted in the use of CSTC WIP as a
(un-intentional) buffer or shock absorber. This shock-absorber is a coping mechanism
that was developed by the CSTC management in order to meet the variability in demand
they saw from internal customers. In the current situation, the supply chain shock
absorber requires the CSTC to accelerate and decelerate work in process in an attempt to
meet material transfer requests via a highly manual process. Figure 3.5 illustrates this
principle.
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Figure 3.5: WIP used as a shock-absorber for demand variability
3.5 Inventory and safety stock management
CSTC had an official "no inventory" policy which was originally implemented during the
downturn of 2001 in order to flush cash out of the supply chain. Another way to describe
this policy is that CSTC would only complete a work order from WIP if it had a shipment
request from a final assembly site for that component.
Because a typical component manufactured by the CSTC took between 2 and 8 weeks to
manufacture, the "no inventory" policy significantly hampered the ability of CSTC to
deliver product on-time to the final assembly site in Malaysia. Consider the best case
scenario in which the forecasted demand is normally distributed with the same mean (g)
and standard deviation (a) as the actual demand - i.e. the forecast is perfect. Even in this
perfect world, CSTC would meet or exceed actual demand only 50% of the time. Put
another way, although CSTC management had metrics that assessed on-time delivery to
CSTC customers with a target of 90% or better on-time delivery, the current system
structure had set up the facility for failure to meet this metric.
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As a side note, actual on-time delivery performance ranged from 55% - 65%. In addition
to the accumulation of partially completed product in the form of WIP (see section 3.4),
one coping strategy developed by CSTC in order to improve on-time delivery
performance was to use the effect of manufacturing lot-sizes as an advantage. In reality,
CSTC did not have zero inventory; instead the facility accumulated limited inventory as a
result of the difference between the ordered quantity and the manufacturing lot size for
the component.
3.6 Internal on-time delivery
On-time delivery between the CSTC and its internal customers was an important metric
for the organization. A minimum acceptable on-time delivery (OTD) target had been set
at 90%. In order to report performance against this goal, the planning manager
considered the information he could obtain from the new centralized ERP system and
decided to use shipments. Because of international import/export regulations for high-
end electronics and accounting rules, each shipment leaving the CSTC contained only
one type of component. As the parts were small and lightweight, all shipments were
made by air and the overwhelming majority of shipments arrived at their destination on
schedule based on the ship date. Using this information, the organization currently
compared the required ship date for on-time delivery to the actual ship date and compiled
all shipments for the month to determine an aggregate on-time delivery percentage for the
organization.
While this method for reporting OTD was convenient, because the information about
shipments could be exported directly from the ERP system to a spreadsheet, the data is
not particularly useful for decision making or control. It seemed instead to be collected
for the purpose of reporting on the metric of OTD. Consider the following example
which shows why the shipments measure does not provide consistent and useful data for
decision making.
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The final assembly site places two shipment requests for Component A from the CSTC.
One shipment should be completed today (Week 0) and one should be made on Week 8.
Each shipment request is for a quantity of 50 units of Component A. Let us suppose the
CSTC only has 10 units available in Week 0 and ships these. Then each subsequent
week, the CSTC continues to ship 10 units as the component manufacture is completed
until the first order for 50 is satisfied. In Week 8 the CSTC has 50 units available and
ships them as requested. Table 3.1 summarizes this simple example.
S50 10 Yes 10 Yes
1 10 No
2 10 No
3 10 No
4 10 No
5
6
7
8 50 50 Yes 50 No
Reported on-time delivery: 33% 60% 50%
Table 3.1: On-time delivery metrics example
Note that under the current reporting method, 33% OTD would be reported while under a
more traditional service metric called fill-rate, the percentage of units shipping on-time
would be reported. Using fill-rate in this case we would report 60 units on time out of
100 units ordered for an on-time delivery or fill-rate of 60%. Fill-rate is commonly
referred to in the literature as Type II service (Nahmias 1997; Spearman 2000). Another
commonly used measure of service level in the literature is called Type I service. It
measures weekly if a stock-out has occurred. This metric is captured by the third column
in Table 3.1. While a metric based on a Type II service level definition will always be
higher than Type I, it more typically represents the type of information management in an
organization desires.
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Note that the current metric discourages a practice that may be in the best interest of the
organization - that is shipping partially complete orders. In the example above, if the
CSTC had simply waited until all 50 units for the first order were complete and shipped
them as one shipment, the OTD would actually increase to 50%, according to the
currently used metric, although the result may be less desirable for the customer.
A second concern applies to all the commonly used metrics for on-time delivery
performance - they equally penalize an order that is one week late and an order that is 8
weeks late. Certainly the effect of this difference on the customer is significant and
should be considered in any newly proposed system.
No matter the definition of the metric, however, OTD for the same Component A as
described in Figure 3.3 and 3.4, averaged 50 - 65% during the past 9 months which was
significantly below the minimum management target of 90% and all parties conceded that
improvement was necessary in the realm of OTD to CSTC customers.
3.7 Chapter summary
The primary take-away from this chapter is that the current reality of operations at the
CSTC can be characterized as "launch-and-expedite". In other words, work orders are
launched into the process based on the plan. These planned orders continue through
manufacturing until a shipment is requested by the corresponding internal customer.
Then the responsibility of a planner or manager at the CSTC is shifted to expedite mode.
The work order is prioritized in a morning team scheduling meeting and expedited to the
customer in order to achieve an on-time shipment for the organization.
It is important to note that this system of "launch-and-expedite" was not part of an
operations strategy articulated by the firm, but instead a coping mechanism developed by
the planners and production managers for dealing with the "no inventory" edict and the
extreme demand variability they experienced at their node in the supply chain. Chapter 4
will explore other strategies for mitigating the demand variability seen at the CSTC
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supply chain node. The trade-off is that the strategies recommended in Chapter 4 will
require coordination and communication across organizations, while the coping strategy
of using WIP as a shock-absorber focused on what was immediately controllable by the
planning manager at CSTC.
The quantitative data presented in this chapter on order flow or on-time delivery
represents the simplest case - a component that passed directly from CSTC to PIMO
without an intermediary step at an outside contract manufacturer. Certainly a process that
requires this additional step would experience even greater variability amplification and
internal bullwhip effect from the actual customer orders to the demand experienced by
the CSTC. Approximately 50% of component types manufactured by the CSTC went on
to a contract manufacturer prior to final assembly while the other half went directly to
final assembly.
In addition, it should be understood from this chapter how current metrics for specific
organizations (marketing & sales, product line inventory manager, planner, etc.) drove a
focus on specific outcomes. It did not seem that any person or organization was
responsible for the operations system as a whole. This is often the case in a corporation,
where in the nature of efficiency job tasks are split and work is specialized. While it
makes sense that the majority of a corporation should be engaged in work tasks in this
manner, it is equally important that some portion of an organization consider the big
picture and system as a whole. Otherwise, as in the case of CSTC, many small
independent operations decisions can combine to create a significant operations
performance shortfall.
While a well articulated operations strategy can help guide dispersed decision making,
there are also tactical steps and processes which can be put in place to help support
system level operational excellence. Chapter 4 will examine a variety of such tactical
steps that could be implemented by an organization like the CSTC in conjunction with its
customers and suppliers. Chapter 5 will reflect on a limited scale, actual implementation
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of the recommendations from Chapter 4. Chapter 6 on the other hand will address more
strategic operations concerns and the organizational fit of these at Agilent and the CSTC.
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Chapter 4: Hypothesis for change towards the ideal state
Hypothesis: Implementing safety stock as a buffer to decouple the demand variability of
end-customer orders from the planned work orders for components would significantly
improve operational performance and, in particular, on-time delivery of components
within the Agilent supply chain without incurring additional costs.
Figure 4.1 below illustrates the decoupling effect of the buffer safety stock between the
two supply chain nodes.
Vaiable Endistomer
Make to planI
CZ KC PIMO "
Make to order
Figure 4.1: Decoupling statistical safety stock buffer (FGI)
In order to test the hypothesis above, a mathematical model was used to quantify the
effects of the proposed change (adding statistically-sized safety stock) on inventory levels
throughout the supply chain in conjunction with on-time delivery performance, as well as
plan stability. Statistically determining optimal safety stock levels for the decoupling
buffer required multiple inputs including those shown in the figure below.
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Figure 4.2: Building blocks for operational excellence
This chapter focuses on gathering the proper input data in order to calculate statistical
safety stock levels for the proposed buffer and on determining which settings in the ERP
system must be adjusted in order to implement a safety stock buffer as proposed in Figure
4.1 above.
4.1 Order sizing
The size of orders placed between the final assembly organization and the component
supplier organization can significantly alter the magnitude of the bullwhip effect
experienced by a component supplier (Spearman 2000). Section 3.2.2 plotted data for
orders for Component A between a final assembly site in Malaysia and the CSTC and it
highlighted the effect of a minimum order quantity of 50 on order variability. According
to their own admission, planners at the CSTC set current order sizes somewhat arbitrarily
at the beginning of a components life, in order to prevent too high an order frequency
from the final assembly sites. Therefore, order sizing was identified in this study as an
opportunity to reduce the internal bullwhip effect.
When there is an explicit cost to placing or shipping an order between organizations, an
economic order size can be calculated using standard formulas (See Appendix C). In the
example of the CSTC, however, ordering costs are implicit. Orders are suggested
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automatically via the ERP system, and shipping costs are allocated by the Colorado
Springs site in aggregate back to the CSTC based on quarterly spend. These costs are
allocated back to CSTC products as part of the overhead burden rate. CSTC products, as
custom semi-conductor components and chips, have a very high cost-to-weight ratio. As
such, they are always air-shipped, and shipping costs do not vary significantly depending
on the quantity of parts shipped. With ordering costs approaching zero, the economic
order size formula suggests a minimum order quantity of one unit.
In this case, there were two practical limits on order frequency. First, any reduction in
order quantities could not require such a large increase in the number of shipments that
the shipping department required another employee to meet the increase in workload.
Second, the planning cycle of the ERP system was run weekly, which limited standard
order frequency to weekly periods.
An investigation of the ERP system revealed that it could leverage information about
future planned demand and automatically adjust order size parameters as a result. This
method of order sizing, called days-of-supply, would prevent multiple orders for the same
components in the same weekly period, while providing the flexibility to automatically
adjust order sizes as demand patterns changed. For example, setting the order modifier to
five days of supply would allow the final assembly and test site to order one production
week's worth of material per week. Another benefit of this feature is that it is based on
forward-looking demand patterns, so if there is a predicted spike in customer orders
(known as a "big-deal" within the company), the final assembly site is capable of
ordering larger quantities for that specific week, but not all other weeks.
Recommendation: Use the "days of supply" order modifier to regulate order quantities.
4.2 Manufacturing lot sizing
Aside from direct labor hours, lot size is the most significant driver of part costs for
component production at CSTC. Higher part costs earn more "recovery dollars" for
CSTC in the short term since it is a cost center, but high part costs also encourage the
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CSTC's internal customers to look elsewhere for components in the future, threatening
the long term viability of the operation.
Although lot sizes were not critical to implementation of the project, lot sizes are an input
for the statistical safety stock calculation formulas used in the project. Revisiting lot
sizes depending on the life-cycle position of a product (ramp-up, maintenance, or end-of-
life) was a potential value to the organization from an operations cost and efficiency
standpoint. Currently lot sizes were set during the new product introduction phase and
often not changed, even when actual demand patterns differed significantly from original
forecasts. Management at the CSTC had initiated a project to consider formalizing lot
sizing methods. My involvement with the project was a way to build currency with the
CSTC staff and management for my own proposal.
Therefore, as part of the project, I developed a tool to allow planners at the CSTC to
calculate the optimal lot size based on the Economic Build Quantity formula. According
to the formula, optimal lot size is achieved at the point where the incremental set-up costs
per unit time are equivalent to the incremental inventory holding costs per unit time. This
standard formula is explained in more detail in Appendix C. The spreadsheet-based tool
that was developed also plotted the results, so that the CSTC planners and process
engineers could see visually if the current lot size was in an acceptable range. Figure 4.4
shows an example of the output from the tool for a typical CSTC product. Note that there
is a "knee" in the curve, beyond which incremental changes in lot size do not
significantly affect unit costs.
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Figure 4.3: Example trade off between set-up cost and inventory holding cost
In addition to helping planners determine optimal lot size ranges for their components,
the tool also helped support decision making for process engineers. For example, the tool
highlighted components with lot sizes that were far to the left of optimal due to other
processing limitations (where set-up costs were extremely high per part) as candidates for
set-up time reduction by process engineers.
Recommendation: Use the economic build quantity calculation to identify opportunities
for significant cost reduction through set-up time reduction.
4.3 Job scheduling and WIP management
Like many manufacturing organizations with long lead times, the CSTC found itself
stuck in the "planning loop" (Stalk 1988). That is, long lead-times for manufacturing
processes necessitated use of sales forecasts to guide planning. However, as lead-times
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lengthen the accuracy of sales forecasts declines. With increased forecasting errors,
inventories increase and the need for safety stock at all levels increases. Errors in
forecasting also lead to more unscheduled jobs that must be expedited, commanding
capacity originally designated for scheduled jobs. As WIP increases, the lead-time
required to complete a job increases and the cycle continues, expanding the planning
loop. The reinforcing nature of the planning loop is illustrated in Figure 4.4 below.
reliance on forecasts to
+ plan production
manufacturing
lead-time "Planning Loop"
+ Qforecast error
work in process
(WIP) + total inventory in
Supply chain
expedited jobs
Figure 4.4: Simple system dynamics model of the planning loop
In order to implement a safety stock buffer without increasing total inventory dollars in
the supply chain, this "planning loop" needed to be broken. There are two approaches to
reversing the planning loop (Stalk 1988): producing to forecast (i.e. reducing expedited
jobs in the above diagram) and reducing time consumption (i.e. manufacturing lead-time
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in the above diagram). Both must be addressed in order to effectively reverse the
planning loop.
The first recommended step is to produce to forecast. In other words, once an order has
begun processing in the CSTC shop, it should be completed. Conversely, expedited jobs
should be limited. Instead of constantly altering the schedule of jobs in WIP in order to
match actual orders, the statistical safety stock should be the buffer. Within the ERP
system used by Agilent, producing to forecast is enabled by the item-level planning time
fence. The time fence can be set to the processing lead time for a given component.
Once this is done, the ERP system will not try to re-schedule jobs that have already
begun processing. Implementation of the item-level planning time fence also ensures
only jobs that the firm intends to complete enter the work queue and the work queue will
more closely follow first-in-first-out (FIFO) scheduling rules.
The second recommended action to break the planning loop is to reduce lead times in the
system. The easiest way to reduce lead times is first to reduce WIP, such that actual
processing times fall (according to Little's Law) and then to reduce the queueing time
assigned to parts to reflect the new reality. According to Stalk (1988) products only
receive value added work for 0.05% to 2.5% of the time they are in the factory. More
recent "rules of thumb" from (Weiss 2004) estimate that in a high-tech manufacturing
process, products receive value added work for 1/6th of the time, or roughly 17%. For
most components manufactured at the CSTC, value added time represented 15 - 25% of
scheduled lead time, with queueing time representing the remainder. While
improvements in process engineering could certainly reduce lead times, the reduction in
queueing time allocated a component, as supported by reductions in factory WIP levels,
represents a stronger management lever.
Recommendation: Set the item-level planning time fence in the ERP system to the
processing lead time. Monitor WIP levels in the shop and compare with forecast
demand. Monitor actual work order starts and completion dates. When these are
consistently shorter than processing lead time, gradually decrease built-in queueing times.
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4.4 Quantify forecast error
Forecast error is one of the most influential, yet least accurate inputs to a statistical safety
stock calculation formula. As noted in section 3.1, historical forecast information was
not archived by the ERP system, so securing this information required data sharing
between the product level demand planner and the component supplier (CSTC).
Product level forecast data was manually exploded down to the component level and then
recorded at the corresponding component lead-time. These forecast data were then
paired with actual order data to calculate the historical standard deviation of the weekly
forecast error.
Although this manual process was feasible for a limited number of components, it was
time-consuming and not clear that repeating it for numerous components of the same
types of products would add significant value. Therefore, a second simplified process
was also proposed for use until a new module of the ERP system (called inventory
optimization) that will archive and calculate forecast error, is available. The simplified
method used the demand planner estimate about future forecast accuracy directly to
estimate forecast error. For example, during a new product introduction, the demand
planner expects the forecast to be less accurate (higher standard deviation of error) than
during product maturity. Since the demand planner is already tracking and capturing this
information, the component level planner could benefit from a sharing of this information
not currently contained in the ERP system.
There are two primary differences in the simplified method. First, it estimates the
forecast error at the forecast date, not at the component lead time when the forecast must
be used. Although this simplified method might make the forecast look more accurate,
since Agilent froze forecasts two months in advance, lead time considerations on forecast
accuracy were negligible. Secondly, the simplified method is forward-looking depending
on the product life-cycle, while the original method is based completely on historical
data. As product life-cycles continue to shrink, this second difference becomes more
important to consider. It is possible that forward-looking expectations of forecast error
will be more accurate than ones based on historical data.
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Recommendation: Coordinate with the product level demand planner to obtain historical
forecast data until the new ERP module is implemented. Information transparency across
multiple organizations within the same company is a significant benefit of a large
connected ERP system. The company should also consider changing permission settings
in the system, such that it is possible for planners in the CSTC to view upper-level
forecast data.
4.5 On-time-delivery measurement
The fill-rate metric, or type II service level (see section 3.6 for details), is recommended
for use by the CSTC because it most accurately represents the concern of its customers.
Customers of the electronics products and services division of Agilent most often order
single units of product - therefore any increase in product availability should reflect
positively on component suppliers, and the fill-rate metric aligns incentives to encourage
incremental increases in product availability. In addition, fill-rate is straightforward for
planning management to calculate by reporting on data extracted directly from the ERP
system. Since management at CSTC had agreed to a goal of 90% on-time delivery or
better, the first target was set at 90%.
If the CSTC supplied components to its internal customers with 90% OTD, one might
wonder, would the end customer also experience 90% OTD or would it be different (See
Figure 4.5).
CSTC final assembly End customer
components & test service level(Malaysia)
90% fill-rate 90% fill-rate
Figure 4.5: Service level in a multi-echelon supply chain
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One practical solution to the problem of setting service levels in a multi-echelon supply
chain is to make the assumption of bounded demand as introduced by Simpson in 1958.
That is, in the case where demand exceeds the maximum demand a company wishes to
satisfy from safety stock, we assume that management at that node will resort to
extraordinary measures. For example, a manager might use expediting, overtime, or
subcontracting to handle the excess demand (Graves 2000; Graves?). Such actions would
be beyond the scope of the proposed statistical safety stock model, so they will be
disregarded when considering service level targets.
Recommendation: Use the fill-rate on-time delivery metric with an initial target of 90%.
4.6 Statistical safety stock setting
Once the necessary input data is collected, a standard statistical model can be used to set
the target safety stock level between the component supplier and the final assembly site.
The proposed system is make-to-stock with periodic review (weekly due to the ERP
system design) and a fixed manufacturing lot size. Thus, the recommended safety stock
model is called the base stock model. Safety stock targets for a 90% fill-rate can be
calculated according to the base stock (Q, r) model following the procedure in
Appendix D.
When the base stock model is used in conjunction with a type II service level definition
or fill-rate, traditionally, safety stocks are calculated according to an approximation
formula (Brown 1959; Parr 1972; Kruger 1997) or looked up manually from a table
found in the appendix of many operations or statistics books (Nahmias 1997). The need
for approximation functions and look-up tables stemmed from the difficulty of computing
the value of the standardized loss function L(z) which is defined as:
L(z) = (t - z)#(t)dt
where $(t) is the standard normal density. The approximation formula, which is a
polynomial curve fit based on the function above, is given in Appendix D. Although this
curve-fit has been used in practice for some time, with modem computing and built-in
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spreadsheet capabilities it is possible to directly compute the standardized loss function.
As long as targeted service levels are greater than 85%, either method should be
equivalent, but for lower service levels the approximation formulas are not recommended
(Johnson 1993). If possible direct computation should be used.
The original intention of the project had been to design one inventory buffer located
physically either at the final assembly site or the CSTC. However, the structure and
capabilities of the centralized ERP system constrained the proposed solution
implementation. Although the ERP system provided options for vendor-managed
inventory solutions at final assembly sites, it did not allow for the same practice when the
supplier was internal. In other words, the ERP system design governed the process of
interactions between organizations within the same company.
Without investing significant time and money in customization for the ERP system, the
existing software required designating two inventory locations - one at each site in order
for the buffer concept to function. Although two inventory locations in sequence would
require more total inventory in the system than one, it provided an opportunity to
leverage the existing IT infrastructure and to implement the proposed changes by simply
"adjusting knobs" in the existing system. The two options are summarized in the figures
below.
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PIMO
Preferred Option: Single Buffer
- Single inventory location between CSTC and
PIMO physically located at PIMO.
LSTC
- Minimizes total inventory in the system.
3.25% less inventory than "practical" option
(exact amount depends on selected service
level)
- Requires configuration changes at PIMO and
CSTC to planning and ordering systems in
Oracle. Opposition from IT department.
Figure 4.6: Preferred Safety Stock Configuration
Practical Option: Split inventory location
- Two inventory locations
at PIMO
- one at CSTC and one
Ak PIMO
- Leverages existing ERP capability and builds on
work already implemented at another technical
center.
- Less change required by CSTC partners for
implementation.
- Support from IT department.
Figure 4.7: Practical Safety Stock Configuration
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In either option, it was calculated using the base stock formula that the total amount of
inventory required in the supply chain to achieve a 90% or greater service level would be
equal to or less than the current amount of inventory dollars in the supply chain for
Component A. Also note that selecting the practical option does not eliminate the
possibility to implementing the preferred option at a later time when resources are
available to customize the ERP system. Therefore, after considering implementation
barriers, the clear choice was to propose a split inventory buffer location.
As mentioned previously, manufacturing lot sizes can change the recommended safety
stock setting (Kruger 1997; Nahmias 1997) and this is included in the calculations in
Appendix D. Conceptually, consider the following example. Component A is
manufactured in lot sizes of 50 units. The average demand is 10 units per week. When a
lot of 50 units is completed the parts are put into stock. During the next few weeks the
stock of 50 units is depleted. It is really only in the last week or so prior to replenishment
that there is a danger of stocking out. If we do not take manufacturing lot sizes into
consideration when calculating safety stock levels, we will be overly conservative about
stock-out potential and end up with too much inventory in the system.
In the specific case at Agilent, due to the historically low service level provided by CSTC
to Malaysia, buyers in Malaysia were somewhat skeptical that CSTC could achieve 90%
OTD under any sort of operations policy. This history influenced the recommendation,
and the team chose to not include manufacturing lot size in the safety stock calculation,
so that they could under-promise and over-deliver on this product to their partner, with
the hope that over time as trust was built between the organizations, important factors
like lot size could be included. Another reason, beyond the history, is that buyers in
Malaysia were familiar with the concept of statistical safety stock. However, in
Malaysia they don't have manufacturing lot sizes - so essentially their lot sizes are
always one. Neglecting lot size was also a way to use formulas more familiar to the
associates in Malaysia for the team project.
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Recommendation: Use two inventory buffers at first to speed implementation, but retain
the option to switch to one if this option becomes more attractive and easier to implement
in the ERP system in the future. Initially also neglect the effect of manufacturing lot size
on safety stock calculations until trust in the organization's ability to deliver is
established. Again later, the effect of manufacturing lot size can be introduced to further
reduce total inventory in the system.
4.7 Future state predictions
The first few building blocks proposed (setting order quantities, lot sizes and review
periods) are all techniques to reduce the bullwhip effect between organizations within a
firm. Lee, Padmanabhan, and Whang divide causes of the bullwhip effect into four
categories: batching, forecasting, pricing, and gaming behavior (Lee 1997a). The
recommendations above address batching and forecasting issues, which are primarily
internal to the firm. Pricing by the firm, such as end-of-quarter discounts offered by the
sales department and gaming behavior by customers are not addressed, but could be
considered in future studies.
Once the internally controllable causes of the bullwhip effect have been addressed,
statistical safety stock can be calculated and implemented without significant increases to
total supply chain inventory. This safety stock will enable the CSTC to achieve the
service levels demanded by its customers. The figure below compares total inventory
levels in dollars required in the supply chain for Component A currently (horizontal line)
with that required for a variety of service levels.
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Figure 4.8: Current vs. future supply chain inventory and service levels
Note that the current total inventory dollars in the supply chain should be able to support
> 95% service level; however, the firm is only able to achieve 60% at best with the
current system design. The goal of the combined recommendations here is to alter the
system design such that it is possible to achieve the desired service level.
Finally, after the building blocks are in place and the safety stock has been implemented
along with FIFO order processing in the component manufacturing area, we expect that
less WIP will lead to shorter actual lead times. This result will effectively break the
"planning loop" and allow continued improvements by decreasing built-in queueing
times, therefore reducing the total safety stock inventory required by the supply chain.
4.8 Chapter summary
This chapter recommended specific actions in order to improve CSTC operational
performance. These actions, when combined will improve on-time delivery to CSTC
customers, while simultaneously stabilizing CSTC processes and reducing WIP at CSTC.
The next chapter studies a pilot implementation of these actions focused on improving
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on-time delivery (OTD) from the CSTC to its internal customers and considers the
lessons learned from the pilot project.
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Chapter 5: An implementation case study
Chapter 3 showed that the CSTC was currently performing below its objective of 90%
on-time delivery to its internal customers. In fact, OTD provided by CSTC to its
customers in the past nine months had been 60% based on the fill-rate metric. Chapter 4
proposed how this situation could be changed within the resources currently available to
management. After thorough discussion and consideration by all stakeholders involved
in the supply chain, support was provided to the proposed project. The project was also
listed by CSTC plant management on the plan of record as a method for remedying on-
time delivery problems. Management support for the project was conditional upon
successful completion of a pilot implementation of the recommendations discussed in
Chapter 4 with a limited set of products. At this point work on the project accelerated
and a multi-disciplinary, multi-organization task force was formed to implement the
recommendations.
The following section will discuss the implementation of the recommendations with an
emphasis on what other organizations might learn from Agilent's experience.
Implementation results including challenges, learning, and data will be presented from an
on-going pilot experiment in CSTC operations. In addition, the methods of implementing
standard operations principles in order to improve on-time delivery from CSTC to partner
organizations will be described.
5.1 Pilot implementation objectives
It is important to understand that the objective of the pilot implementation was not to
determine the costs or benefits of using statistical safety stock as a buffer, since this
principle is well known and has been documented in the literature as well as in practice.
Instead, the objective of the pilot implementation was to prototype the new production
process specifically by:
1. Validating all ERP mechanics necessary to implement OTD improvements.
2. Developing planner knowledge to manage the transition from current state to
future state for multiple future products.
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In addition achieving the objectives stated above, deliverables from the pilot project
included:
1. An Excel-based tool that calculated, via queries to the ERP system,
a. Economic Build Quantity ranges
b. Safety Stock levels for CSTC and partner locations
c. Average inventory levels and expected variation
2. An Excel-based tool that filtered and prioritized exception messages generated by
the ERP system for planners
3. A summary of lessons learned that should be considered in the transition to a full-
scale roll out
4. A written plan for full-scale roll-out that included a transition plan and designated
which items should be excluded
Throughout the pilot phase and during the transition to a full-scale roll-out, the pilot team
also monitored and recorded weekly metrics for each of the pilot items including:
1. Total inventory value and location (at each supply chain node)
2. Number of ERP system exceptions that require action (schedule in/out, etc.)
On-time-delivery (OTD), number of days late if late, and variability of processing time at
CSTC were also recorded and compared to historical data as work orders completed.
5.2 Pilot implementation results
The official pilot implementation project at Agilent ran for six weeks and was successful
at implementing and integrating all of the elements noted in Chapter 4 for Component A,
through the centralized ERP system. For example, one of the building block elements
implemented for the first time in the pilot project was use of the item level planning time
fence (PTF). Within the CSTC, use of the PTF eliminated requests from the ERP system
to schedule-in or schedule-out jobs for Component A that had already started processing.
This helped to stabilize work in the CSTC shop during the pilot project beginning with
Component A. In addition, the fixed days of supply order modifier supported weekly
orders of components between Malaysia and the CSTC as anticipated. Instead of orders
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occurring in groups of 50, as in the example for Component A in Chapter 3, weekly
shipment requests from Malaysia were in smaller groups according to the weekly demand
of the end customer.
The manufacturing lot size, or build quantity, was also adjusted to approach the ideal lot
size for Component A as part of the pilot project. For Component A, the build quantity
was changed from a quantity representing 1.83 sheets of substrate, to one representing 4
sheets of substrate. This change took into account both the physical process constraints,
i.e. there are X parts per sheet of substrate, and the EOQ formula calculations (see
Appendix C). The primary purpose of the lot size change was to test the change method
in the ERP system, should it be necessary to increase or decrease lot sizes in the future.
Statistical safety stock targets were also set for CSTC as well as Malaysia, according to
the recommendation of an Excel-based tool which drew input data directly from the ERP
system. Beyond the six-week pilot project, data continued to be collected on inventory
and OTD performance for Component A, as part of the CSTC organization's efforts to
improve OTD to its partners. A summary of the actual vs. predicted supply chain
inventory levels for Component A during the pilot (first 6 weeks) and several months
beyond is shown in Figures 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3.
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Figure 5.1: Component A inventory control chart for CSTC site
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Figure 5.2: Component A inventory control chart for final assembly site
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Figure 5.3: Historical vs. current average supply-chain inventory level component A
The dashed horizontal line represents the predicted average inventory level, while the
solid horizontal lines represent two standard deviations above and below the predicted
average inventory level. The plots are a type of inventory control chart for planners and
the team task force which suggest they review more details about a component if actual
inventory levels at a specific node are outside of the two sigma zone. Note in the figures
above that the actual inventory at CSTC was primarily within the expected zone, while
inventory at the partner organization remained much higher than statistical models would
predict. As a result, total inventory in the supply chain was above average historical
levels (see Figure 5.3). This unexpected system behavior triggered an investigation
during the pilot project, the results of which are discussed in more detail in section 5.3.
OTD for Component A was at 100% for shipment requests during this same time.
Although the target OTD was only 90%, the result is logical for two reasons. First, a bug
in the ERP source code caused extra orders for Component A to be placed from the final
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assembly site to the CSTC (more details in section 5.3). Second, aside from one single
"big order" at the beginning of the pilot project, average weekly demand was only 80%
of the forecasted demand for the period. Therefore, there was more than sufficient
inventory to meet demand. Eventually, the forecast and work plan were adjusted. As a
result the safety stock targets and predicted average inventory levels for Component A
were reduced for Q2 of 2005 by the planner. This shift in targets is also shown in Figure
5.1 and 5.2. The planner taking initiative to adjust settings in the ERP system for Q2 of
2005 provides evidence that the planners at CSTC are becoming comfortable with the
new process and the statistical setting of the safety stock.
While the overall pilot was successful, it also highlighted several concerns which needed
to be addressed by Agilent and the CSTC in the future. These are discussed in the
lessons learned and next steps sections.
5.3 Implementation surprises and lessons learned
Although the primary purpose of the pilot project was to prototype the changes necessary
in the ERP system, the task force leading the implementation did not anticipate the
breadth or the depth of ERP issues that the project would uncover. Despite extensive
documentation about the ERP system and the support of internal and external ERP
experts for the project, the implementation team discovered field interactions,
synchronization issues and a source code "bug" that had not been previously
documented.
With ERP fields and settings that are so intricately connected, it is possible that no one
(even the provider) knows exactly how each field is connected to all other fields and how
they may or may not update each other over time. In other words, the effects or
consistency of changes made in one field of the ERP system often could depend on
settings that populate other fields. While this is expected of a complex integrated system,
it is very possible that within the firm, each of these fields that interact with each other is
controlled by different associates under different management.
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For example, in the Agilent ERP system, when the design engineer creates a bill of
materials for a product, he or she may also select component suppliers from the approved
supplier list in the ERP system. Because the rules were not clear, on some internally
sourced parts, such as those from the CSTC, the approved supplier list field was
populated, while on others it was not. The implementation team discovered that when
manufacturing lot sizes within the CSTC were changed by a planner or process engineer,
the effect on the calculated processing lead time by the ERP system differed depending
on the setting by the design engineer in the approved supplier list field. The benefit of
building in advance an interdisciplinary and multi-organization team or support network
in order to resolve such ERP system interaction issues in a timely manner can not be
overstated.
The second major lesson learned was about the importance of synchronizing and
understanding the timing of various changes made in the ERP system between the
supplier and buyer organizations. For example, in order to see the effects of changes to
the ERP system in the next weeks' plan, instead of waiting until all outstanding orders
had been filled (approximately 8 weeks) existing Internal Sales Orders had to be deleted
concurrently by both CSTC and the partner organization. Then the weekly plan had to
run and generate the "new" planned orders. Next the partner organization had to issue
internal requisitions for the parts in the system, which would finally cause the ERP
system to generate new Internal Sales Orders. It is important that the deletion and re-
insertion of the orders is well coordinated between the two parties involved, because even
with daily phone calls the implementation team experienced some hiccups in this process
and it took more than one week for the system to properly generate new sales orders
based on the updated parameters.
In addition to the previous issue that can be relegated to the category of human error,
there are inherent synchronization issues built into any ERP system design. Although
every effort was made to synchronize changes for the pilot part across organizations,
certain fields in the ERP system were updated based on other fields on different
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schedules. The most important timing to coordinate was to make all changes before the
weekly plan began collecting data. In the case of CSTC, cost information was updated
quarterly, while processing time was updated monthly. Because of these synchronization
issues, it was important to monitor "implemented" parts for about a quarter after the
changes had been made in order to avoid any surprises.
The most significant discovery during the pilot implementation was a bug in the ERP
source code. Like other software bugs that escape early detection, this one required a
certain sequence of events in the ERP system in order to be manifested. First, actual
customer orders had to surpass the planned orders in the ERP system. Next, the partner
organization had to request shipment of an internal order prior to the original scheduled
ship date. Finally, the CSTC had to ship the order in advance of the original planned ship
date, per the ERP system request. When these events occurred, the order would be "lost"
from the ERP system while in shipment and additional expedited orders would be
generated by the system to meet the demand and cover for the lost units. Once the "lost"
shipment was received by the partner organization, logged into the ERP system and the
weekly plan was run, the additional expedited orders would be cancelled leaving CSTC
with excess inventory.
The unfortunate consequence of the bug was automatic double-ordering by partner
organizations when customer orders were greater than the original forecast followed by
subsequent under-ordering or canceling of orders when shipments arrived. This ERP bug
effectively increased the bullwhip effect for internal component orders. This bug was
also identified as a major source of the higher than expected inventory level at the partner
organization during the pilot.
During the pilot project, the bug was documented by the team and acknowledged as an
issue by the ERP system vendor. Because it involved the source code, however, the issue
could not be resolved by Agilent alone, it had to be addressed by the vendor. Although
the initial estimate for a release that fixed the bug was two months from the date of
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discovery, four months have passed without a fix from the ERP system vendor. In the
meantime, Agilent has by necessity continued operations under the current system.
This bug was important not only for the pilot project results, but for all components
shipped by CSTC to partner organizations. However, it might not have been discovered
had the extra resources of an MIT student not been allocated to the project
implementation team. This discovery highlighted an important lesson for future projects
- that someone on the team must have the bandwidth to investigate and follow up with
seemingly illogical results from the ERP system in order to discover the root cause.
Usually, the result won't be a bug, but instead a misunderstanding by the team of certain
ERP system fields. Still, it is possible that the ERP system contains additional
undocumented field interactions or bugs, so it is important that users of the system try to
understand what the system is doing and how it is making its calculations.
5.4 Continuation and expansion of work
Despite the complications, overall the results of the pilot project were successful and it
provided an excellent learning environment for the entire interdisciplinary team. Since
the official completion of the pilot project, the program to reduce the bullwhip effect and
implement statistical safety stock has been expanded to multiple additional CSTC
products. The comfort level of the CSTC associates with the recommendations has
greatly increased due to the results of the pilot program. CSTC planners have become
strong advocates of the program because even with this limited set of parts implemented
the item-level planning time fence, which limited rescheduling inside of lead times, in
combination with the safety stock buffer has significantly reduced their time spent
rescheduling and expediting work orders.
Orders for Component A have achieved 100% on-time delivery during the five-month
period since implementation. In addition, manufacturing jobs for Component A have
completed processing in the CSTC shop in four weeks, instead of the eight weeks
allowed for with queueing time. This performance has led to discussions to gradually
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reduce the queueing time built into the ERP system for the part, thus allowing a reduction
in overall safety stock and supply chain inventory levels.
Surprisingly, even with 100% OTD, due to personnel turnover at the Malaysia final
assembly site, a new buyer was discovered to have increased the safety stock level
settings in the ERP system without notifying the rest of the team. When this issue was
raised, the buyer commented that he was "not comfortable" with the safety stock level the
team had set. Presumably, because the employee was new, he or she did not know that
Component A had sufficient safety stock at CSTC to actually deliver to the one-week
lead time for shipments that the system promised, as opposed to other components which
the buyer managed where suppliers were not really able to deliver in the one-week
allotted time. It is important to remember that despite any analytical optimizations, this
human intervention in the supply chain can also have significant effects on the achievable
results.
Finally, work by the firm on the ERP inventory optimization module, which could
automatically calculate statistical safety stock settings, continues and the team is hopeful
that it will be implemented throughout the company within the next year.
5.5 Chapter summary
Overall, the pilot implementation project was successful and as a result, the task force has
continued to expand the changes to additional products. All parties continue to support
the implementation and planners at CSTC have acknowledged a significant reduction in
the rescheduling chaos of their jobs when this new system has been implemented on a
component they oversee. The organizations involved are beginning to experience some
positive results of the project such as improved on-time delivery and sanity of processing
schedules. However, some of the major improvements promised by the project, such as
lead time reduction and lower total supply chain inventory, have yet to be realized.
Finally, the efforts of the task force have set the stage for the CSTC to transition
smoothly to the ERP system Inventory Optimization module, which is proposed to be
adopted by Agilent in one year.
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The pilot project proved that the implementation of a seemingly simple, previously-
proven change in a complex system, like a modem state-of-the-art ERP system, can have
far reaching and sometimes unintended effects. The pilot project demonstrated that it is
important to prototype the change process within the actual ERP system, not just a
theoretical or simulated ERP system. In addition to some unexpected behavior from the
ERP system, actions taken independently by individual members of the supply chains
also had a significant effect on the project results.
While this chapter focused on the technical challenges and results of the implementation,
Chapter 6 will consider the organizational context and its role as the people of Agilent
strive towards building operational excellence in the Agilent supply chain.
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Chapter 6: Organizational context and impact
In this chapter anecdotal data from the solution development and implementation will be
provided to depict the organizational context. The chapter then considers the relevance
of the organizational context for further operations improvements. The challenging part
of supply chain management is that it must span across many disparate entities of an
organization structurally, politically and even culturally. In order to develop an efficient
supply chain these three areas must be in alignment across all supply chain nodes. For
this project at Agilent it is interesting to examine the CSTC in the context of its changing
supply chain relationship with other organizations in the company.
6.1 Structure: Recent changes disrupted the CSTC
The structural design of Agilent is best characterized as a loose collection of
decentralized groups. While this organizational design had been effective in the past,
recent structural changes were straining the system.
Decentralized groups
In the context of a supply chain project, the decentralized division-based structure at
Agilent posed a challenge in trying to coordinate and implement changes across divisions
and groups. Although there were some examples of individuals "moving up the ladder"
of management from centralized groups, it was clear that power and upwardly mobile
career paths began in the divisions, not corporate functions. Therefore, as a member of a
central corporate organization in a decentralized company, it was important to develop
my influence skills, as neither I, nor other members of my group, had any official
structural power to implement our projects.
Recent structural changes
In an effort to recover from the downturn, many structural changes were instituted and
the CSTC was trying to cope effectively with these changes during my tenure. For
example, the CSTC was changed from a profit center belonging to the Colorado Springs
Group, to its own cost center. Structural changes such as this one had significant
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operational effects, as management focused on achieving new metrics important to the
cost center. For example, the cost center structure encouraged planners to release more
material into the shop than the available capacity, because on the books, the organization
got credit for this operational step. Conversely, as a profit center the same planners had
worked diligently to ship product at the end of a quarter, but as a cost center shipping was
considered overhead. Since there was no longer value-add credit for shipping in the new
structure, incentives to ship at quarter-end, despite potential customer needs, lagged.
The second significant structural change following the downturn was the increasing role
of Agilent Malaysia in CSTC operations. Now that the final assembly and test site for
the majority of CSTC products was not part of the same P&L group nor the same
physical facility, it led to a greater need for supply chain and other cross-organization
coordination. High turnover in Malaysia, the time difference, and cultural expectations,
as well as lack of geographic proximity, hampered the development of linking
mechanisms between these decentralized groups that had served the company well in the
past. For example, during a period of six months, the buyer in Malaysia for a particular
component the CSTC supplied changed three times.
In addition, Agilent Malaysia had its own structure, which was different than Agilent
facilities in the States. There were more hierarchical levels for associate positions in
Malaysia than in the States, and this was coupled with a strong functional emphasis in
Malaysia. Job titles were also more important in Malaysia than in the States. Because of
the growing importance of the relationship between Malaysia and CSTC, several task
forces were formed to improve communications and alignment.
Finally, and most significantly, the CSTC had recently weathered its first layoffs in
company history and during this project the layoffs continued. These layoffs eliminated
60% or more of the workforce at the CSTC. Many of those who did stay with the
company were re-assigned to new tasks. The organizational result was a structure with
many holes in knowledge and responsibility, as well as disrupted informal links between
groups.
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The recent layoffs also challenged the ability of the Agilent organization to develop a
coherent culture across all sites.
"As we've become larger, we really spread the people who have the ability to
pass along the HP Way in subtle kinds of ways... We, as a company, still depend
on those leaders who have these characteristics to continue to pass them on to the
current management structure which is very diverse, very matrix-oriented, with a
lot ofdotted lines." HP Manager (vonWerssowetz 1982)
The next section will discuss some observations of localized divisions in the strong
Agilent culture.
6.2 Culture: Friendly and loyal
The Agilent culture is a supreme and ubiquitous testimony to the "HP Way". So
dominant is the HP Way, that a casual observer might think Agilent was HP. Many
Agilent employees told me that they got the "real" part of HP in the split, despite the
change in name. Several aspects are critical to understanding the strong Agilent (HP)
culture including: innovation, engineering, individuals, history and respect.
Innovation
Innovation is at the heart of the Agilent culture. Displayed on banners and posters
throughout the site was the mantra "Agilent: Innovating the HP Way". Dominating the
interior decor were the recent patents from CSTC employees. These cultural artifacts
were so important to Agilent that they were embossed on plaques which were installed
inside glass display cases throughout the hallways.
This strong culture of innovation posed a significant challenge for managers and those
striving for the type of standardized processes, rules and consistency typically associated
with operations. The challenge for the manufacturing leadership within the company was
to develop a culture that could successfully marry free-wheeling engineering innovation
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with operational excellence. For example, when the CSTC plant manager was asked "Of
which projects from the past year are you the most proud?" his response included the
development and invention of new physical manufacturing processes, but no strictly
operational improvements were mentioned.
Individual based relationships
Agilent is a company built upon the integrity of many individuals, and central to an
individual's success at the company is his or her cultivation of relationships with others.
While the relationship-based culture can be rewarding for long-time employees, it can
make obtaining information difficult for newcomers.
"People find out about individuals here by direct contact. There is a lot of that
here, and people recognize those that are sharp, that they feel comfortable with,
that have the skills. There is a lot of informality..." HP Employee
(vonWerssowetz 1982)
One symbol of this relationship-based culture was the coaching I received on
approaching new contacts. E-mail was deemed too impersonal for initial contact with
another employee. Phone calls were acceptable for those employees at another site;
however, face-to-face contact was always preferred. Thus my mentor took great efforts
to walk me around the buildings and to introduce me to his co-workers - often we would
stop by an empty cube several times before resorting to a phone call.
Given current business realities at Agilent and CSTC, one might expect an environment
of mistrust, or hostility, but that was not the case. The strong culture dictated a basis of
respect for every person. Even cooks in the cafeteria made an effort to know each and
every employees name and to greet them with a friendly smile. I have never worked at a
company where the people were as cordial and respectful as at Agilent.
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History & respect
The strong individual relationships and maturity of the workforce also produced an
environment of trust. The majority of my team worked from home, and each member of
the team was physically based at a different Agilent site. This was not a problem for
GSCE management, which trusted each individual employee to get his or her work done
and to make independent decisions. This trust between management and employees
extended to me, even as an intern. My supervisor did not get involved in my project
unless I called a meeting or asked him for specific advice. Even then, he saw his role as
reducing bureaucratic obstacles to progress, not becoming involved in recommendations
or decision making.
At Agilent, employees are often introduced by their length of service with the company.
For example, "This is Amy. Amy has been with the company for 22 years." The length
of service is typically mentioned in introductions prior to a job title or current
responsibilities, if these are mentioned at all. Loyalty to the company is a source of pride
and respect is commanded by those with the longest service. In fact, it is more common
to know a fellow employee's start year than it is to know his or her official position in the
organizational structure. The average length of service at the CSTC was over 15 years.
In contrast, the maximum length of service at the Agilent Malaysia final assembly and
test site was under 10 years. This generated unspoken tensions, as the CSTC employees,
due to the traditional Agilent culture, felt they should engender much more respect than
they received from Malaysian employees due to their length of service. Service years
were not the only cultural discrepancy. In Malaysia, an employee's title and position on
the organization chart was also very important, which conflicted somewhat with the
importance of personal networks in the States.
Along with the respect for length of service and loyalty to the company was an unspoken
requirement of humility. Employees would often compliment others by degrading
themselves. For example, "I've only been here for 15 years, but Dave knows much more,
he's been here for 22." Employees who had PhDs, MBAs or Six Sigma Black-Belt
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certifications did not go around proclaiming these qualifications. Likewise, I was
encouraged to be humble and not mention that I came from an east-coast school unless
asked. Often in preparation for a meeting, my mentor would coach me on proper
socialization and the interpretation of norms at Agilent. He would begin with, "From
what I know about the way we do things around here..." and as I continued my
experience I would add each nugget to my Agilent cultural cache.
6.3 Politics: Shifting basis of power
In the Agilent that was rebuilt after the downturn and following separation from HP,
players were still working to find their new sources of power in the organization.
Although the engineers still dominated, in order to save the company from bankruptcy
they had been forced to share some power with their business counterparts.
Engineering
Agilent was a company of engineers who design and develop products to sell to other
engineers. The engineers led the company. Within engineering, there was a clear
pecking order defined (Sheinbein 2004). My mentor explained to me that EE design
engineers ranked above all other types of EE, followed by software engineers, other
engineers, and finally non-engineers. However, at the end, he added that in today's new
economy the cost accountants just might need to be moved to the top of the list, because
"They seem to control everything nowadays." His comment highlights a transition
happening within Agilent. Prior to the split of Agilent from HP, PC's and peripherals
dominated revenue; hence analysts focused on that part of the company. Test and
measurement was largely left alone as a "cash-cow" run by a bunch of engineers. As the
newly formed stand-alone company struggled to return to profitability from the downturn
of 2001, some power was shifted to those in business roles. The growing role of
accounting in the new company highlights the shifting basis of power and also the
relative importance of the financial performance of the test and measurement division to
the new company.
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It is interesting to note that even my home organization, Global Supply Chain
Engineering, had the word engineering included in the name of the group although the
majority of its members came from accounting, finance, statistics, manufacturing and
other business areas. Officially, this group put engineering in the team name to
differentiate it from other supply chain groups in the company, which, for example did
not develop mathematical models. However, this is still a testament to the continuing
power of engineering in the Agilent organization.
The engineering power base is reinforced by hiring practices. Entry level engineers are
recruited from top schools nationwide via a rigorous and competitive selection process.
Conversely, entry level business employees tend to be recruited from local colleges or
work their way up from manufacturing, facilities, and other line jobs. While very high
level business positions may be recruited from top sources, it is possible that employees
in business and operations functions do not have a formal college education in business
or operations subjects.
Inter-organizational politics
In light of recent corporate restructuring, the CSTC was finding it difficult to make the
transition to a potentially less powerful role in the company. Technical centers like
CSTC had been shrinking over time as some capabilities they provided became
commoditized and could be outsourced. As they got smaller, they lost power in the
organization, and some individuals within the technical center wondered if it was just a
matter of time before the entire CSTC would be dissolved.
Additionally, the new final assembly and test site in Malaysia (PIMO) was trying to exert
its power over CSTC in the relationship. Buyers and planners in Malaysia were infamous
for quotes such as "They are just a supplier," or "The suppliers must respond". This
inflexible attitude towards suppliers by relatively new employees of the company in
Malaysia frustrated those in the CSTC. CSTC process engineers found it difficult to
view themselves as similar to commodity suppliers to final assembly. "We make the
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money parts. Without us, they would be assembling a box of little or no value," CSTC
process engineers would claim.
Certainly, had CSTC been an external organization to the company, it could have exerted
significant supplier power to "hold-up" its customer (PIMO) as CSTC produced unique
products that no-one else in the world could make. However, as part of the larger
organization and same company, CSTC lost some of this power and the management and
engineers at CSTC resented it.
As I progressed with my internship, I was conscious to develop my basis of influence as
much as possible in order to form coalitions that could make the implementation of my
operations recommendations a reality. In forming coalitions to support the project
recommendations, I had to be mindful of strong existing individual loyalties in the
organization. Eventually, I gained the respect and support of senior level plant
management and division leadership because I had the ability to get information they
could not, and I was able to apply this information in order to address some metrics on
which they were lagging. As a result they included my project in the FY05 Plan of
Record when presenting to their superiors. I also developed an alliance with the
corporate IT group which eventually viewed implementation of my project as "what we
had originally intended for the ERP system, before we ran out of time and budget and had
to just implement what we had."
6.4 Leading change in the organization
Leading the change process at Agilent CSTC required me to learn two important lessons.
First, I needed to exercise more effective use of the power of influence, and second, I
needed to embrace the role of a "satisfier" over that of a "maximizer" (Wheeler 2004).
One feature of the communications style at Agilent is not only the ability to seek the
advice of anyone in the company, but also the expectation that those who can contribute
will be sought out (vonWerssowetz 1982).
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"I guess one of my first reactions was seeing how many people I had to check
things with before I went ahead and did something. And it wasn't the tone of
saying, "Look, you have to get their approval." It was in the tone of saying,
"here are some people that probably really have something to say about what you
are doing, you really ought to talk to them." It was that kind of subtle difference,
but it really ended up in getting approval.
It comes across as, "There are some people that you really ought to check bases
with and ifyou've got a reasonable proposal, they'll support it." I thought
several times that ifsomebody said you have to do this before you can do
something, I would have said forget it! But it's more of selling the idea. And you
do that on a very personal basis. Not very many times does anybody come along
and say you can't do something. It's a subtle influence process." HP Engineer
(vonWerssowetz 1982)
Internalizing what is expressed in this quote was critical to the success of the pilot project
implementation. As an outsider, I didn't comprehend the extent to which each and every
individual needed to be consulted and enthusiastically embrace the project in order for it
to move forward. Initially, I relied too much on obtaining structural approval for the
project from the official leaders of the organization. In addition, I did not allow enough
time for selling my proposal in my initial project plans. Understanding this cultural
reliance on the powers of influence and driving decisions to the lowest level in the
organization up-front would have helped me to develop a more realistic original project
timeline. While my initial timeline allowed less than a week for the selling activity, in
the actual timeline of the project this process took almost two months (see Figure 6.1).
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(2 months) (1 month) (1-2 months) (2 months) (On-going)
Figure 6.1: Actual project timeline
The second key take-away from my experience leading change on my internship was
learning to embrace the role of a satisfier over that of a maximizer. In engineering school
students are all taught to be "maximizers" - that is seeking the optimal solution to a given
problem. However, it is important in business that the perfect solution doesn't become
the enemy of the good (Wheeler 2004). For example, following the analysis of the CSTC
supply chain there were two options for implementation. One was the maximizer
solution - the theoretical optimal configuration. After further investigation, it became
clear that Malaysia and the information technology organization would object to the
optimal solution. Therefore, I proposed we implement a near-optimal solution.
The proposed solution required 3% more inventory in the supply chain than the optimal
one; however, it was still below the inventory levels currently and would provide a 90%
or greater on-time delivery compared with the current 60% results. In her article on
negotiation, Wheeler asserts that satisfiers are often more satisfied themselves because
they are able to achieve their objectives without requiring a monumental effort to launch
changes. This was certainly the case with my project at Agilent which would not have
been implemented without the full support of the corporate IT organization or the
planners in Malaysia.
This maximizer vs. satisfier framework can also be applied in regard to the influence
process described above. It order to get the project approved, many different
organizational sub-cultures needed to align. For example, the IT group which supported
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the ERP system operated in one world, where the timelines for projects were described
roughly in years and estimates for particular project completions might shift on the order
of months. Conversely, at a manufacturing site like the CSTC, changes were conducted
by the hour and the day. This temporal mismatch between two organizations which
required cooperation for the implementation of the project was a problem. It was
addressed by proposing a staged implementation strategy. Realizing that the optimal
ERP solution could take a matter of years, while the CSTC required an immediate
solution for OTD issues, the implementation team proposed a staged implementation that
allowed both parties to agree to take action today while making sure those actions could
be leveraged by future longer-term projects.
6.5 Implications for the future of operational improvements at CSTC
Increasing training for operations personnel is fundamental to driving further
improvements at CSTC and throughout the Agilent supply chain. Training is necessary
both for those who will be leading the efforts and those who will be doing the actual
implementation. Agilent relies heavily on the HP practice of management by objectives
(MBO). MBO means that a manager, supervisor, planner or machine operator when
given the proper guidance (objectives) is probably better able to make the right decisions
about his or her work than some executive. This system places great responsibility on
individuals and drives decision making to the lowest levels of the company. As such, all
associates must be highly skilled in their disciplines.
With all the turnover and shuffling ofjobs in the downturn, some of this skill, particularly
in operations, has been lost. The standards for operational efficiency in the industry have
also risen over time. Not taking full advantage of standard operations practices means an
organization is leaving money on the table, something that no firm in today's competitive
marketplace can afford to do.
The return on investment (ROI) for additional training in operations should be reasonable
for an organization within Agilent like the CSTC to justify. Consider that other
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manufacturing organizations are able to increase productivity year over year by up to
10%. It would be reasonable to expect a 5% increase in productivity at CSTC as a result
of additional operations training. Any bottom-line cost savings due to productivity
enhancements translate directly into the firm's profits, whereas top-line sales revenue
increases are reduced by COGS before adding to firm profits. For example, a firm with
50% profit margins that increases total sales revenues by $1, will see an increase in total
profits of $0.50. Instead, if the same firm reduces total costs by $1, the firm will see an
increase in profits of $1.00. For products with smaller profit margins, the multiplier
effect of cost savings is even greater.
Additional operations training would also ease the difficult role of the middle manager.
A middle manager at Agilent, like most other companies, must be skilled at translating
from the language of things (operations) to the language of money (finance) and back
again (Goldratt 1984; Fine 2005). Such bi-lingual abilities require significant skill
development which can also benefit from continued training.
6.6 Chapter summary
Implementing this project across multiple decentralized groups required a central focus.
For this project, the method was to concentrate on on-time delivery as a unifying metric.
In this case OTD resonated with multiple individuals in the supply chain because it
already had management attention as a below-target metric, and this helped create a sense
of urgency. With the significant premiums Agilent can charge for its high-tech products,
the firm doesn't want operations to be the bottleneck. When OTD is too low, operations
is a bottleneck costing the firm by delaying incoming cash flow from customers and
potentially encouraging customers to switch to competitors products.
This chapter highlighted the implications of the pervasive Agilent culture and
organizational context on implementing change in this firm. The chapter also illustrated
some methods which were successful for bridging the decentralized groups in the
company, such as staging implementation of changes and promoting less than optimal,
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but better than status quo, solutions in order to gain support from all parties. Finally, the
chapter asserts that innovation in operations should not be an oxymoron, and it
encourages further training in operations principles and practices for Agilent associates in
order to drive additional productivity enhancements.
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Chapter 7: Conclusions and follow-on work
7.1 Introduction
This thesis presented a method to characterize a real, functioning supply chain in the
context of a changing economic environment and industry structure, as well as in the
absence of perfect data. It showed the analysis, recommendations, and results from a
particular supply chain case study at Agilent Technologies Inc. It demonstrated how
classic text-book operations principles can be applied in practice and highlighted specific
roadblocks to be mindful of during operations improvement project implementation. It
also discussed the organizational behavior of the firm and the impact of this on the
project. This chapter will review the supply chain project and give recommendations for
next steps.
7.2 Summary of analysis and recommendations
Although industry cycles in the electronics test and measurement business are outside of
the control of Agilent management, internal sources of variability can be minimized.
Chapter 3 presented sources of internal variability in the CSTC supply chain by
examining internal data from forecasting, planning, and customer order flow. Chapter 3
also considered operations practices regarding capacity, job scheduling, inventory
management (raw material, work-in-process and safety stock), and on-time delivery
performance. The analysis showed how a system of "launch-and-expedite" had
developed in the organization as a coping strategy for demand variability, in the absence
of a clear unifying operations strategy.
Recommendations focused on improving on-time delivery. This unifying metric was
leveraged to promote implementation of several basic operations principles. Suggestions
centered on (1) reducing the amplification of variability due to the supply-chain design
and ERP system settings and (2) implementing statistical safety stock as a buffer for
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demand variability between the CSTC and its internal customers. Specific practical and
actionable recommendations were given in Chapter 4.
The current state analysis and recommendations sections of this thesis highlight the
importance of understanding basic operations principles. Sophisticated techniques were
not necessary to significantly change the outcome and performance of the supply chain
studied. In addition, it was important that these basic operations building blocks be put in
place prior to implementing more sophisticated methods.
7.3 Results and caveats
Implementation of the recommendations focused on testing the necessary changes for a
limited number of parts in the ERP system. The pilot implementation was successful,
though as expected, the ERP system was the primary cause of implementation surprises
and lessons learned. The results from the pilot project were very important in expanding
the use of internal variability reduction and statistical safety stock to additional product
lines. Although total supply chain inventory levels during the pilot project suffered from
some hiccups in the ERP system and some human errors, project team members
understood that the specific results were not statistically significant. Thus, the pilot
project served to inspire team members to believe that changing the current state of
operations was possible and that they could comprehend and lead this change themselves.
Some cautions about the liberal application of these principles to all products at the
CSTC and other Agilent technical centers should be noted. This project focused on those
components which represent the largest dollar value percentage of CSTC business. For
CSTC they also represented some of the highest volume components. Internal empirical
data suggested that for components with a monthly demand below 15 units, order
variability increased significantly and would be too high to economically support a safety
stock system like the one described. For such components, a make to order system or a
safety stock system with a much lower target service level may be preferred. The
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methodology presented here should be used for 'A' parts, when following traditional
operations practice of designating 'A', 'B' and 'C' parts (Spearman 2000).
7.4 Recommended next steps
While associates at Agilent have begun to see a change in operations due to
implementation of these operations building blocks to their supply-chain, expansion of
this program and follow-on operations work promises to bring more significant
improvements. Recommended follow-on work includes2
" Expansion of the pilot program
o Implement recommendations on all 'A' components
o Expand variability reduction efforts to the contract-manufactured parts
(PCBs) supply chain
o Include effect of lot size to reduce safety stock buffer at CSTC
o Reduce built-in queueing time in the ERP system for parts, using data
recorded for which jobs typically are completed prior to scheduled
completion date
o Set CSTC raw-material inventory levels statistically for key components,
such as custom ASICs
o Work with process engineers to target specific set-ups for time reduction
based on economic build quantity analysis
o Work with ERP experts to eliminate the double buffer between CSTC and
partner organizations
" Improve training programs for operations personnel
* Quantify the cost of a stock-out
o How many days late is okay? For which products?
o Is 90% OTD a good target? For all parts?
* Explore additional bull-whip reduction methods
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2 Not listed in any particular order
o Consider if pricing behavior by the firm, such as end-of-quarter discounts
offered by the sales department, is amplifying variability of orders and
quantify this effect in terms of total cost to the firm
o Consider if customers exhibit gaming behavior when placing orders and
quantify the effect of this on variability of orders
7.5 Summary
In conclusion, this thesis showed how a combination of macro-economic, business, and
organizational factors can lead a well-run company or technical center to adopt a
"launch-and-expedite" operations behavior with a negative impact on operational
performance. The thesis also showed how it is possible for an organization that finds
itself in such a state to rely on basic operations principles to systematically get out of the
"launch-and-expedite" system. As such, those involved with the project hope that the
insights and lessons learned from this work will be of interest to the general population of
manufacturing and operations managers, particularly those in the capital equipment
business, who are confronted with increasingly complex supply chain issues.
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Appendix A: Effect of forecast translation from months to weeks
We show here that although the translation of the forecast from months to weeks adds to
the standard deviation of the forecast error, this effect is not significant in comparison to
the magnitude of the typical coefficient of variation for Agilent and thus can be
neglected.
In the ERP system used by the CSTC, 2/3 of the months have 4 weeks per month and 1/3
of the months have 5 weeks per month. In other words, each year has 32 weeks that are
part of 4 week months and 20 weeks that are part of 5 week months. How significant is
the additional variability caused by the system when it translates the demand planners
monthly forecast into a weekly one? Consider the following example.
The monthly forecast is for 55 units per month for the entire next year. Then, the weekly
plan is for 11 units for 20 weeks or 13.75 units for 32 weeks. For the weekly plan, over
the course of the year, we have:
= 1.35
p, 12.69
Normalizing this information so that it is applicable to other monthly forecasts, the
coefficient of variation is:
CO= w _1.35_COV 1.6 = 0.1064
puw 12.69
While this COV is significant for a final assembly site in the Agilent supply chain, given
that the CSTC currently sees a COV of 1.4 on weekly orders, the additional 0.1 COV due
to the ERP system forecast propagation process is not significant. As can be seen in the
following table, the effect on COV will not change depending on the magnitude of the
particular monthly forecast, although the absolute value of the variance scales with the
magnitude of the forecast.
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Std.dev 0.135 1.351 13.509 135.094
Mean 1.269 12.692 126.923 1269.231
COV 0.106 0.106 0.106 0.106
Table A.1: Effect of magnitude on monthly to weekly forecast translation variability
However, this opportunity to change to weekly forecast data input should be examined as
an opportunity for future internal supply chain variability reduction.
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Appendix B: Coefficient of Variation for a Poisson distribution
Consider the example from Chapter 3 where each Poisson "event" is an order for 50
units. We show here that the coefficient of variation (COV) is independent of the number
of units per event for a Poisson distribution as long as the number of units per event is a
constant.
Let y = 50 * Poisson(A)
For a Poisson distribution we know:
Mean P = 2
P, =50*A
Variance n2 = A
V(y)= 50 2 *A
Standard deviation a- = VIA
U- = 50*
Therefore, the Coefficient of Variation for the Poisson distribution will simply be:
COV =-= 50* - 2
p, 50* A A
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Appendix C: Economic Build Quantity
Let Q* represent the optimal manufacturing lot size that minimizes the total cost
associated with manufacturing the items. Optimal lot size will be achieved at the point
where the incremental set-up costs per unit time are equivalent to the incremental
inventory holding cost per unit time. This can be expressed as follows:
D = demand per unit time
K =fixed "set-up" cost per lot
h = inventory holding cost per item per unit time, also known as inventory
carrying cost
KD hQ
Q 2
2KD
h
* Note that the same formula applies to calculating the economic order quantity (EOQ),
except K is the fixed cost per order placed.
As a lower bound, h can be set equivalent to the cost of capital for the organization. For
inventory that has spoilage costs or significant warehousing costs, the inventory holding
cost should be increased to reflect these realities. Although there will always be debate in
a firm as to the true inventory holding cost, a bounded estimate should suffice for most
practitioners.
More significant to the operations professional is the effect of changes in set-up cost or
future demand per until time on the economic build quantity. Therefore, in a high-mix
low-volume shop like the CSTC where these numbers are likely to change, it is best to
perform a sensitivity analysis and determine an acceptable range for the economic build
quantity, rather than a single target figure.
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Finally, physical limits need to be considered when setting the EOQ. An example, at the
CSTC was images per snap. Each snap might have 24 images of a component. These
images would not be separated until mid-way through the manufacturing process. As a
result, any specified lot size needed to be in multiples of 24. Another type of physical
limit might be an oven, which is a single resource and can only fit a maximum of X units.
In this case, set-up costs would be non-linear when the capacity of the oven is reached.
In addition, the effects of any process yield being < 100% should also be taken into
account when setting lot sizes.
A more complete treatment of traditional economic order quantity calculations can be
found in most operations textbooks (Nahmias 1997; Spearman 2000; Simchi-Levi 2003).
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Appendix D: Statistical safety stock determination
This appendix provides the statistical safety stock calculation formula for a continuous
review, fixed order quantity, fixed lead time system (Q,r model) with a Type II (fill-rate)
service level metric. It shows how safety stock settings can be calculated using either
common spreadsheet functions, a look-up table or an approximation formula. For a more
complete explanation of this formula see a productions and operations management
textbook such as the one by Nahmias (1997).
Key assumptions:
" Demand over the lead time can be approximated by a normal distribution with
mean (pD) and standard deviation (D)
" Demand is independent in non-overlapping time increments
" Forecast errors are also normally distributed with mean (pe), standard deviation
(cye), and they are independent and non-overlapping in time
* Lead time is fixed (L). In practice this assumption can be relaxed and a normal
distribution can be used to approximate lead time (Kruger 1997) if again we
assume that successive lead times are independent and orders are not allowed to
overlap
Note that while any applicable time period can be used (days, weeks, months), in this
project weeks were used, as most of the available data was weekly.
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Variable definitions:
fr: desired fill-rate (service level percentage) expressed as a decimal
f(k): unit normal partial expectation; also known as the unit normal partial loss
function; noted as L(z) in Nahmias (1997)
k: the 'safety factor' as referred to by Brown (1959)
L: lead time in weeks
Q: replenishment quantity (i.e. manufacturing lot size or economic order quantity)
pD: average weekly demand during the lead time
Gce: standard deviation of weekly forecast error
Calculation of safety stock:
f(k)= Qe *( - fr)
Oncef(k) is known, the value of k can be either looked up manually from a chart, like the
one on page 109 of Brown (1959) or in Table A-4 of Nahmias (1997). Since manual
look-up is not plausible for an automated tool, as developed for calculating safety stocks
in this project, two other methods for determining k can be used.
(1) Spreadsheet calculation:
Note thatf(k) can be broken into two functions and written in terms ofp(t)
CIOo
f(k) = J(t - k)p(t)dt = p(k) - k Jp(t)dt = p(k) - k(1 - c(k))
k k
where p(k) is the normal probability density function and c(k) is the cumulative
distribution for the standard normal distribution. In this new format,f(k) can be directly
calculated via standard spreadsheet tools. For example, in Microsoft Excelf(k) is:
- k * (1 - NORMSDIST(k)) + NORMDIST(k,0,1,0)
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Sincef(k) is known, k can be solved for in Microsoft Excel using the Goal Seek or Solver
method to satisfy the function above.
(2) Approximation formula:
k can also be solved for using the natural log approximation formula given by Parr (1972)
and Kruger (1997) where:
f(k) = e(0.92-1.19k-0.37k2)
This is the formula for a quadratic approximation of the unit normal partial expectation,
which represents the average quantity backordered, measured in standard deviations.
The following plot shows how these two methods give the same results.
Safety Factors
0.4500
0.4000 - Direct calculation 
_
0.3500 Approximationformula
e 0.3000
U 0.2500C
0.2000
S0.1500 -
ca 0.1000
0.0500
0.0000 L-a
0.0 1.0 2.0 3.0 4.0
Safety factor (k)
Figure E.1: Comparison of service function calculation methods
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Determine safety stock:
Once k has been determined by any of the methods listed above, safety stock will be:
SS = k* * J
Aside:
One calculation of interest to management may be to determine what percentage of
demand will be filled for a given component simply based on the replenishment lot size,
with no safety stock at all.
The value off(k) for k 0 is 0.3989. Therefore, the fraction of demand filled from stock
without delay will be:
fr =1- 0.3989* *v
From this simple calculation, management can compare the current position to the
increase in inventory (i.e. cost) to achieve a greater service level. Note that for smaller
lot sizes, more safety stock will be needed to achieve a given service level.
91
Bibliography
Anderson, E. G., Fine, C. and G. Parker (2000). "Upstream volatility in the supply chain:
The machine tool industry as a case study." Production and Operations
Management 9(3): p. 239, 23 pgs.
Barnholt, N. (2003). Does our Industry Have a Future? Opportunities for Innovation.
SEMICON West.
Blaha, D. (2002). Designing A Strategic Sourcing Process For Low Volume, High
Technology Products. LFM Thesis. Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology.
Blake, T. (1999). An Analysis of Engine Assembly and Component. LFM Thesis.
Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Brown, R. G. (1959). Statistical Forecasting for Inventory Control, The McGraw-Hill
Book Company, Inc.
Coughlin, R. L. (1998). Optimization and Measurement of a World-Wide Supply Chain.
LFM. Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Felch, J. (1997). Supply Chain Modeling for Inventory Analysis. LFM Thesis.
Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
Fine, C. (2005). Operations Strategy Course Lecture (15.769) at MIT.
Fine, C. H. (1998). Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary
Advantage, Perseus Books.
Goldratt, E. M. a. J. C. (1984). The Goal: A Process of Ongoing Improvement. Croton-
on-the-Hudson, NY, North River Press.
Graves, S. C., and Sean P. Willems (2000). "Optimizing Strategic Safety Stock
Placement in Supply Chains." Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
2(1): 68-83.
Johnson, M., H. Lee, T. Davis, and R. Hall (1993). "Expressions for Item Fill Rates in
Periodic Inventory Systems."
Kruger, G. A. (1997). "The Supply Chain Approach to Planning and Procurement
Management." Hewlett-Packard Journal 48(1): 28-3 8.
Lee, H. L., V. Padmanabhan, and S. Whang (1997a). "The Bullwhip Effect in Supply
Chains." Sloan Management Review 38(3): p. 93-102.
Nahmias, S. (1997). Production and Operations Analysis, Irwin.
Parr, J. 0. (1972). "Formula approximations to Brown's Service Function." Production
and Inventory Management 13: 84-86.
Samuelson, P. A. (1939). "Interactions between the Multiplier Analysis and the Principle
of Acceleration." Review of Economic Statistics 21: 75-79.
Schmidt, S. E. (2003). Impact on Order Fulfillment Process Costs of Bounding Demand-
Side Uncertainty through Structured Flexibility Contracts. LFM Thesis.
Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of Technology: 89 pgs.
Sheinbein, R. F. (2004). Applying Supply Chain Methodology to a Centralized Software
Licensing Strategy. LFM Thesis. Cambridge, MA, Massachusetts Institute of
Technology: 76.
92
Simchi-Levi, D., Kaminsky P., and Edith Simchi-Levi (2003). Designing and Managing
the Supply Chain: Concepts, Strategies, and Case Studies, McGraw-Hill Higher
Education.
Spearman, W. J. H. a. M. L. (2000). Factory Physics: Foundations of Manufacturing
Management, McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
Stalk, G. (1988). "Time -- The Next Source of Competitive Advantage." Harvard
Business Review: 41-51.
Sterman, J. D. (2000). Business Dynamics: Systems Thinking and Modeling for a
Complex World, McGraw-Hill Higher Education.
vonWerssowetz, R., and M. Beer (1982). Human Resources at Hewlett-Packard. Harvard
Business School Case. Cambridge, MA: 23.
Weiss, A. (2004). Personal Communication to. M. Sahney. Colorado Springs, CO.
Wheeler, M. (2004). "Too much of a good thing? The role of choice in negotiation."
Negotiation 7(9): 1-4.
93
